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I. INTRODUCTION
The explosive growth of the Japanese economy during the postwar
period has brought about fundamental changes in the structure of
Japan's financial markets.' Japan's transition from a capital-starved,
war-stricken economy to the world's largest creditor nation has
brought about tremendous structural changes in Japanese financial
circles.2 Financial reform, therefore, has been a longstanding topic of
interest in government and economic circles.
In the summer of 1991, two advisory bodies to the Japanese
Ministry of Finance (MOF) issued official reports containing their
respective recommendations for reforming the nation's financial
system.3 The Financial System Reform Council deliberated on the
* I am deeply grateful to David Sneider, Esq., at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, and to
Atsushi Shimizu and Atsushi Yashiro, both Duke L.L.M. students, for their kind assistance in
providing me with many of the Japanese-language resource material cited in this Note. I would
also like to acknowledge the financial support of the Duke International Studies Grant Program,
and the Janet P. Chiang Scholarship Fund. Finally, I would like to thank my wife Jennifer for
her patience and understanding.
1. See infra notes 93-169 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 9-92 and accompanying text.
3. These reports are: FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESEARCH COUNCIL, ON A NEW JAPANESE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM (Federation of Bankers Associations of Japan trans., 1991) [hereinafter
BANKING REPORT]; SHOKEN TORIHuI SHINGIKAI [SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE RESEARCH
COUNCIL], KIHON MONDAI KENKYOKAI HOKOKUSHO [REPORT ON BASIC PROBLEMS], May 24,
1991, reprinted in EKONOMISUTO, July 15, 1991, at 154 [hereinafter SECURITIES REPORT].
Together, the Financial System Research Council and the Securities and Exchange Research
Council issued a total of ten reports over their seven years of deliberation. See Zadankaf" Kin'yiz
seido oyobi shken torihiki seido no kaikaku wo megutte [Round Table Discussion: On Reforming
the Financial and Securities Transaction Systems], JURISUTO, Nov. 1, 1992, at 74, 78 [hereinafter
Round Table Discussion 1]. This Note is concerned primarily with the fifth and final Banking
Report and the fourth Securities Report. The Securities Council issued a fifth report, concerned
primarily with fair competition and fair trading practices, on January 28, 1992. Oguchi kara
jiyaka: Shitorishin saishi hkoku de meiki, NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, Jan. 29, 1992, at 1
(reporting on the Securities Report proposal that the commissions on securities transactions
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subject of financial reform from the perspective of the banking system,
and the Securities Council focused on the securities industry. The
reports issued by the two councils formed the basis for a financial
reform bill that was submitted to the Diet on April 10, 1992,' and was
passed into law on June 26, 1992.' In addition, subsequent rulemaking
by the MOF has further clarified the direction of legal and regulatory
reform.6
Financial reform in Japan, however, has been a gradual process.
The Banking and Securities Reports discussed in this Note embody
over seven years of deliberation by the Financial System Reform and
Securities Councils. The results of these deliberations reflect a number
of concerns: structural changes in Japan's economy, the international-
ization of Japanese finance, and changing patterns of corporate finance
by Japanese companies.7 Events occurring after the reports were
issued, including financial scandals and Japan's plunge into recession,
have further shaped the direction of financial reform. Examined
together, the reports, the Financial System Reform Act, and the
developments that surrounded their creation illustrate the issues
involved in reforming the legal and administrative framework on which
Japan's financial system rests.
This Note will examine recent developments in Japanese financial
reform, focusing primarily on the banking industry, the Banking
Report, and amendments to Japan's banking laws brought about by
the Financial System Reform Act. Part II will provide a historical
overview of Japan's financial system. Part III will continue this
historical discussion, focusing on the issues and problems that have
should be liberalized gradually, starting with larger transactions); Shatorishin h~kokusho: Raishun
jisshi ni teika, NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, Jan. 29,1992, at 3 (reporting that the liberalization of the
securities transaction fee has been slowed by the recent stock market slump).
4. KIN'YO SEIDO OYOBI SHOKEN ToRIHII SEIDo No KAIKAKU NO TAME NO KANKEI
HORrrsU NO SEIBI NADO NI KANSURU HORrsu AN, Mar. 13,1992, reprinted in SHOJI HOMU,
Apr. 10, 1992 (Special Edition), at 13 [hereinafter FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM BILL].
5. KIN'YO SEIDO OYOBI SHOKEN ToIUHII SEIDO NO KAIKAKU NO TAME NO KANKEI
HOirrsu NO SEII NADO NI KANSURU HORrsu, Law No. 87 of 1992 [hereinafter FINANCIAL
SYSTEM REFORM ACT]. The Financial System Reform Act includes numerous amendments,
many of them minor, to a variety of existing laws. The most significant changes are to the
Banking Law, the Securities Transaction Law, and other primary economic statutes. See id. art.
1 (amending Banking Law), art. 15 (amending Securities Transaction Law); infra note 158. To
avoid confusion, all citations to statutes in this Note refer to the preamendment version of the
laws unless otherwise indicated.
6. See infra notes 287-96 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 93-169 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 298-317 and accompanying text.
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emerged in recent times to create pressure for financial reform. Part
IV will discuss the recommendations of the Banking Report, contrast-
ing it with the Securities Report, and will discuss the impact of both
reports. Part V will discuss developments since the reports were
issued, including an overview of the contents of the Financial System
Reform Act and proposed administrative regulations that have been
issued since the Act's passage. Part V will also present an analysis of
financial reform to date. Part VI presents a brief conclusion.
II. HISTORICAL REVIEW
This section briefly decribes the system's pre-World War II roots
and then focuses on postwar developments. It also describes the types
of financial institutions and the regulatory regime to which they were
subject prior to the passage of the Financial System Reform Act.
A. The Prewar Period
Japan based its first modem banking law, the National Bank Act
of 1872, on the American national banking system, although Japanese
banking subsequently developed into a scheme closer to the British
model.9 Between 1872 and the end of World War II, the banking
industry evolved into a heterogeneous system of specialized institutions
catering to particular financial markets. In 1921 savings banks were
segregated from commercial banks in order to limit depositors'
exposure to risk.1° In addition, a sharp distinction between commer-
cial lending and industrial and agricultural financing led to the
demarcation of long-term and short-term lending institutions.1
While ordinary banks were, and still are, the predominant source
of short-term loans, a number of specialized (and often heavily
government subsidized) institutions were established to provide long-
term financing for industry, agriculture, and other specialized sectors
of the economy." The Nippon Kangyo Bank, founded in 1896, was
9. FEDERATION OF BANKERS ASSOCIATIONS OF JAPAN (ZENGINKYO), THE BANKING
SYSTEM IN JAPAN 11-12 (1989) [hereinafter BANKING SYSTEM].
10. Id. at 12. This partial segregation lasted until 1943 when, in order to promote saving as
a part of the war effort, the government allowed ordinary banks to take deposits. Id In order
to reduce the number of banks, the government embarked on a policy of encouraging bank
mergers. As a result, most savings banks, by this time rendered redundant, were merged out of
existence; only five remained by the end of the war. Id
11. Id at 13.
12. Id at 13-14.
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one of these specialized institutions.13 The majority of these institu-
tions eventually disappeared, however, either as a result of the
government's wartime policy of encouraging mergers or through
postwar occupation reforms. 4 The presence of the Nippon Kangyo
Bank, now known as Daiichi Kangyo Bank, and the segregation of
long-term and short-term institutions continue to be an integral part
of Japan's banking system. 5 As shall be seen, however, changing
circumstances render the division between long-term and short-term
institutions increasingly anachronistic.16  In 1922 the trust business
was established as a sector separate from ordinary banking and was an
area in which only trust companies and specialized trust banks could
engage.' 7
B. The Postwar Period
Japan's defeat in World War II and the subsequent American
occupation brought many changes in its financial system, in that "[t]he
existing financial system was basically organized for the purpose of
creating a stable supply of limited funds for each industrial sector in
the post-war era when funds were short." 8  The most significant
change was the segregation of the securities business from banking in
a manner similar to the United States' Glass-Steagall Act, which
prohibits banks from dealing in most forms of securities. 9 Moreover,
13. Id.
14. Id. at 14.
15. See generally infra notes 38-74 and accompanying text (discussing different types of
financial institutions).
16. See infra notes 94, 131-35 and accompanying text.
17. BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 14-15.
18. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 12. Writing on the separation of banking and
securities, a less charitable observer has noted that the purpose of this fragmented system was "to
squeeze as much money as possible from Japanese savers so it could be channelled into industry."
Nigel Holloway, Tokyo's Walls Tremble, FAR E. ECON. REv., May 11, 1989, at 54,55. Note also
that most of the laws that established the specialized banks, discussed infra notes 46-65 and
accompanying text, were passed between 1947 and 1954.
19. Makoto YazawaA Synopsis of Securities Regulation in Japan, in JAPANESE SECURITIES
REGULATION 23,29 (Louis Loss et al. eds., 1983). Prior to this, banks were permitted to engage
in a variety of securities activities. BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 44. Unlike American
banks under Glass-Steagall, however, Japanese banks are permitted to hold equity securities
(including stock in securities companies) for their own account, provided that these holdings do
not exceed 5 percent of the issuing company's total value. Compare SHTrrEKI DOKUSEN OYOBI
KOsEI TORIHIKI NO KAKUHO Ni KANSURU HORrrsu, art. 11, Law No. 54 of 1947 [hereinafter
ANMONOPOLY LAW] with Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933 § 16, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982).
More recently, Japanese financial institutions have been permitted to combine banking and
securities activities in foreign countries where universal banking is permitted. Richard Dale,
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due to the postwar shortage of capital that was vital for economic
development, the government was forced to compartmentalize the
financial industry by fostering different types of institutions to cater to
specific industries. At the same time, the government temporarily
empowered the MOF and the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to set ceilings for
deposit interest rates? Depositors had few other options, and thus
banks were able to obtain capital cheaply and to loan it to industries
at a significant profit.
The capital shortage rendered whole industries beholden to the
banks. To cope with this deficiency, the government began the
practice of overloaning: BOJ would loan more money than was
economically prudent to the large banks, who would do the same to
capital-starved companies."' The companies in turn relied on high
leverage to fund rapid growth and market share expansion.2 This
contributed to the development of the notorious banking keiretsu
system.3 To obtain financing, a company had to cultivate a close
relationship with a single, main bank.24 Banks primarily supplied
loans which provided significant tax advantages over equity financing:
loan interest payments were deductible, whereas dividends to
shareholders came out of after-tax profits.2  As a result, many
companies became highly leveraged, deriving as much as 80 percent of
their capital from bank loans. 6  In addition to loans, banks ex-
changed equity with their debtors and developed long-standing, close
relationships.27 While their heavy debt load generated pressure on
companies to expand their market share (though not necessarily at a
profit) to service their debt,' both the extent of their debt to, and
close relationship with, their banks meant that the banks became
Japan's Banking Regulation: Current Policy Issues, in JAPANESE FINANCIAL GROWTH 33, 35
(Charles Goodhart & George Sutija eds., 1990).
20. This was accomplished by the passage of the Temporary Interest Control Law. RiNji
KINRI CHOSEI HO Law No. 181 of 1947. The original purpose of this law was to prevent banks
from engaging in potentially ruinous interest rate "price wars." See BILL EMMOTr, THE SUN
ALSO SETS 101 (1989). This provisional statute is still in force today. Id.
21. CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE 202 (1982).
22. See JAMES ABEGGLEN & GEORGE STALK, JR., KAISHA, THE JAPANESE CORPORATION
161 (1985).
23. JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 204-05.
24. Id at 205.
25. See id. at 203-04.
26. Id. at 203.
27. See ABBEGGLEN & STALK, supra note 22, at 166.
28. JARED TAYLOR, SHADOWS OF THE RISING SUN 156-57 (1983).
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increasingly responsible for the continued financial health of the
companies.' 9 Bank shareholdings were limited to 5 percent of a
company by the Antimonopoly Law.30  Nevertheless, bank
shareholdings of companies within the keiretsu groups collectively
represented a significant aggregate of control.3 By providing the
only viable source of finance and equity holdings, banks thus exercised
a great deal of influence over the management of their corporate
affiliates.3 2
At the same time, however, the practice of overloaning meant that
all parties had an interest in ensuring that all other parties remained
financially solvent. This interest was centralized at the BOJ, which
traditionally has been "the ultimate guarantor of the system."33 By
centralizing all loan risks at the government level, the system made the
loans virtually risk free for the private sector, leaving banks and
companies alike to concentrate solely on increasing their respective
market shares by expanding into whatever growth industries the
government was trying to foster.' As guarantor of the whole system,
the BOJ "gain[ed] complete and detailed control over the policies and
lending decisions of its dependent 'private' banks,"35 just as the banks
themselves had control over their own borrowers. Given that the
failure of a financial institution would cause catastrophic reverberations
throughout this network of debt, the government would always step in
to prevent such an event from taking place. 6 This whole structure
is sometimes referred to as the "convoy system" (goeiseudan
hoshiki):37 each participant looks out for other participants, and all
29. ABEGGLEN & STALK, supra note 22, at 166-67; JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 204-05; see
also Peter Martin, Ghosts of the Decade Past, FIN. TIMES, May 29, 1992, at 16 ("The close ties
between lender and borrower often lead the banks to cut interest rates for a troubled debtor.").
30. ANTIMONOPOLY LAW, art. 11, Law No. 54 of 1947.
31. Banks and other financial institutions reportedly own over half the value of companies
listed on stock exchanges in Japan. Peter Bohan, Japan's Banking System Remains Healthy,
Minister Says, Reuters, Jan. 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
32. See JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 205-06; see also KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA
OF JAPANESE POWER 121 (1989) (describing tremendous control gained by banks over
corporations because of the capital shortage after World War II).
33. JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 203.
34. ld. at 206.
35. Id. at 203.
36. Saburo Zushi, How to Go Bankrupt and Still Stay Afloat: the Ataka Affair, in POLITICS
AND ECONOMICS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 204, 220 (Murakami Hyoe & Johannes Hirschmeier
eds., 1979).
37. See, e-g., Ozume kin'ya seido kaikaku 6: Sekal no chdrya: "Goso-sendan tsajinai,"
YOMIURI SHINBUN, May 17, 1991, at 7 [hereinafter Gos6-sendan] (criticizing the convoy system
as anachronistic in the time of financial internationalization and liberalization).
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parties arrive safely. The term "convoy" also implies that each
participant must travel at the speed of the slowest member of the
group.
C. The Postwar Financial System
Before discussing events that made financial reform increasingly
necessary, it is important to describe the structure and operation of the
financial system before reforms took place. This section provides a
brief overview of the types of financial institutions and regulatory
regimes that existed prior to passage of the Financial System Reform
Act.
1. Types of Financial Institutions. The first type of financial
instutions are the ordinary banks. These are established according to
the GinkO he or Banking Law.38 Their primary activities consist of
short-term financing, loans, deposits, and fund transfers.39 Apart
from foreign banks, which are established in Japan as ordinary banks,
two distinct categories of ordinary banks exist. The first category
consists of the large city banks (toshi ginko)' such as banking giants
Sanwa and Sumitomo. Well-known at home and abroad, these
institutions play a significant role in the Japanese economy.4 Second,
there are the sixty-four regional banks (chihd ginkd),42 with at least
one in each of Japan's forty-seven prefectures.43 These banks have
their principal offices in large-sized or medium-sized regional cities and
do business primarily within the prefecture in which their principal
office is located.' The distinction between city banks and regional
38. GINKO HO [BANKING LAW], Law No. 59 of 1981.
39. BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 23-24. The banking law itself merely defines the
scope of permissible activities an ordinary bank may engage in as "(1) [r]eceiving of deposit or
installment savings; (2) [Il]oan of fund[s] or discount of bills or notes; (3) [e]xchange transac-
tion[s]." BANKING LAW, art. 10, Law No. 59 of 1981. Ordinary banks may also engage in a
variety of other activities that are "ancillary to banking." Id. art. 10(2).
40. E.g., KAzuO TATEWAKI, BANKING AND FINANCE IN JAPAN 106 (1991).
41. In 1990, 23.8 percent of fund-raising and 30.2 percent of loans were from city banks.
See BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 7.
42. Id. at 23. Note this figure does not include the new "second tier" of converted sigo
regional banks. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
43. Frances Rosenbluth, The Political Economy of Financial Reform in Japan: The Banking
Act of 1982, 6 UCLA PAC. BASIN LJ. 62, 65 (1989).
44. BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 23-24.
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banks has no legal basis but arises instead from custom and administra-
tive convenience.45
In addition to the ordinary banks, there are several categories of
more specialized banks, all of which are affected by the Financial
System Reform Act.46 The first of these is the sogo or mutual bank.
These institutions, eliminated by the Financial System Reform Act,47
were established under the 1951 sago Bank Law and existed primarily
to provide financing for small- and medium-sized businesses.'
Second, there are three long-term credit banks49 established in
accordance with the Long-Term Credit Bank Law.5° Along with
several specialized banks, the long-term credit banks have traditionally
had the exclusive ability to issue debentures.5' There have, however,
been limits on their ability to take deposits.52 Although the Financial
System Reform Act does not formally abolish the distinction, the walls
45. Id. at 23. Article 8 of the Banking Law requires a bank to obtain the MOF's approval
before establishing a branch. BANKING LAw art. 8, Law No. 59 of 1981. This provides the MOF
with a very significant administrative tool for preventing city banks from encroaching on the
territory of smaller regional banks. The MOF has used this form of administrative guidance to
limit the number of branches established by the city banks outside of Tokyo and other major
cities. BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 42.
46. See infra note 268 and accompanying text.
47. FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM Acr, Law No. 87 of 1992.
48. SOGO GINKO HO [MUTUAL LOANS AND SAVINGS BANK LAW], Law No. 199 of 1951,
repealed by FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT, art. 4. Only sigo banks were permitted to deal
in mutual installment funds. FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT, art. 4. Otherwise, they were
allowed to engage in the same activities as ordinary banks, except that, with exceptions, they
could only issue loans to, or receive mutual installment savings from, companies with three
hundred or fewer employees or with capital of less than a designated amount. Id. art. 2(2). In
practice, the sago banks catered to a clientele similar to that of the regional banks, except the
sogos were not subject to the same geographical branching restrictions. See generally BANKING
SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 41-42 (discussing branch establishment regulation and administrative
guidance). There were sixty-eight sago banks as of December 1988. Id. at 25. Having become
increasingly like ordinary banks in their activities, many sago banks began converting to ordinary
banks, even before the repeal of the Mutual Bank Law made conversion or merger unavoidable.
See id. at 25-26. Such conversions were permitted by a 1989 amendment to the law governing
bank mergers. Id. at 26; KIN'YO KIKAN NO GAPPEI OYOBI TENKAN NI KANSURU HOR1Tsu [LAW
CONCERNiNG AMALGAMATION AND CONVERSION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS], art. 3, Law No.
86 of 1968. The conversion of most of the sagos to ordinary banks has effectively created a
second tier of regional banks. See BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 10; BANKING SYSTEM,
supra note 9, at 41-42.
49. BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 24.
50. CHOKI SHIN'YO GINK0 HO [LONG-TERM CREDIT BANK LAW], Law No. 187 of 1952.
51. Id. art. 4; Fumiko Fujisaki, Japan Banks Haggle over Securities Market Entry, Reuters,
May 27, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
52. BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 25.
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between long-term and short-term credit banking have been coming
down.53
The third major type of specialized bank is the trust bank. Along
with nine foreign trust banks, there are seven Japanese-owned trust
banks.' These banks are permitted to engage in the trust business
under a 1943 law granting this entitlement to ordinary banks and long-
term credit banks5 5 Like the long-term credit banks, the bulk of the
trust banks' business is in the form of long-term funding through loan
trusts and other devices.
56
In addition to the types of banks discussed above, there are a host
of other specialized financial institutions which need to be mentioned
briefly, both to illustrate the diversity of Japan's financial system and
to show how together they represent an important conglomeration of
economic and political interests. These other depository institutions
include: the Bank of Tokyo,57 the Shok5 chakin Bank,58 the N5rin
chakin Bank,5 9  shinkin banks,60 credit cooperatives,61  labor
53. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
54. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
55. FuTISO GINKO NO SHINTAKU GYOMU NO KEN'EI NI KANSURU HORTsu [LAW
CONCERNING THE CONCURRENT ENGAGEMENT OF THE ORDINARY BANK IN THE TRUST
BUSINESS], art. 1, Law No. 43 of 1943. Administrative guidance appears to be at least one of the
reasons why more banks have not taken advantage of this law to expand into the trust business;
article 1 of the law requires the MOF's approval before a bank may become a trust bank. Id.
56. BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 25.
57. Though sometimes considered one of the city banks, the Bank of Tokyo (BOT) is
chartered under a special statute, namely the Foreign Exchange Banking Law. GAIKOKU
KAWASE GINKO HO [FOREIGN EXCHANGE BANK LAw] Law No. 67 of 1954; THE JAPANESE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 172 (Yoshio Suzuki ed., 1987); see also BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, app.
1, at 1 (listing the BOT under heading "city banks"). Originally established as the country's only
foreign exchange bank, the BOT's raison d'6tre has effectively vanished because all banks are now
able to engage in foreign exchange activities. Nevertheless, the BOT's international financial
expertise and global network of branches assure its continued viability. Bank of Tokyo: Just
Impediment, ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 1992, at 88.
58. Partially financed by the government, the Shoka chakin Bank is a special institution
established in 1936 to provide financial services for unions of small-sized and medium-sized
enterprises. BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 28.
59. The N6rin chilkin Bank and its branches function as the central bank of the farming,
forestry, and fishing industries. See THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 57, at 232.
Like the Shk6 chakin Bank, it also receives substantial government support. Id.
60. Shinkin banks are cooperative, not corporate, entities that may be subscribed to by
individuals or medium or small enterprises. BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 26. Along with
the ancillary activities permitted to ordinary banks, the shinkin banks may take deposits and
engage in foreign exchange, but they may only issue loans and discount bills for subscribers.
SHIN'YO KINKO HO, art. 53, Law No. 238 of 1951. The viability of these banks is increasingly in
doubt. In the eyes of some observers, the shinkin, like American savings and loans, may bring
down the whole banking system due to excessive involvement in bad property deals. See
Anthony Rowley, Tokyo Worried About Stability of Credit Co-ops: Japan's S & L Crisis?, FAR
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banks,62  agricultural cooperatives,' fishery cooperatives,' and
several other types of cooperative institutions which may engage in
financial activities.6 Many of these individual institutions are also
members of institutional federations.' The Financial System Reform
Act affects all of these institutions, primarily by expanding the scope
of financial activities in which they are permitted to engage.67
There are also foreign institutions. By 1985 over one hundred
branches of foreign banks and securities firms had been established in
Japan.' Foreign bank branches are chartered and regulated as
branches of ordinary banks under the Banking Law,69 while foreign
security branches are subject to a special legal regime.7" A number
of foreign banks have also been permitted to engage in trust activities
in the Japanese market.7'
E. ECON. REv., Jan. 24, 1991, at 36.
61. See BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 27.
62. Similar to the scgos and the credit cooperatives, labor banks are cooperative institutions
whose primary activities consist of installment savings, lending, and deposit transactions for labor
unions and their members. See id at 27-28; RODO KNKo HO [WORKERS' BANKING INSTITUTION
LAW], Law No. 227 of 1953.
63. Agricultural cooperatives actually existed before the Pacific War but did not become
widespread until after the passage of the Agricultural Cooperative Societies Act of 1947. Susumu
Yamaji, Agriculture, in POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 184, 191
(Murakami Hyoe & Johannes Hirschmeier eds., 1979). These cooperative institutions cater to
the financial needs of the agricultural community and engage in a variety of nonbanking
businesses, including marketing agricultural products and purchasing farm equipment. BANKING
SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 29.
64. SuIsANGYO KYODO KumiAiHO [FISHERIES COOPERAnVES LAw], Law No. 242 of 1948.
The main activities of fishery cooperatives are taking members' savings and lending to members.
BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 30.
65. See KYODO KUMAI NI YORU KIN'YO JIGYO NI KANSURU HORrTSU [LAw CONCERNING
TIE FINANCIAL AcrITrEs OF COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATIONS], Law No. 183 of 1949; CHOSHO
KIGYO TO KYODO KUMIAI HO [LAW FOR SMALL BUSINESS COOPERATIVES], Law No. 181 of
1949.
66. For example, all credit cooperatives belong to the National Federation of Credit
Cooperatives, which acts as a central bank for its members. BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at
27.
67. See infra notes 268, 270 and accompanying text.
68. THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 57, at 196. Although Japanese banks
and their overseas securities affiliates were still prohibited from engaging in securities activities
within Japan at the time, in 1986 the MOF began allowing the securities affdiates of foreign banks
to establish branches in Japan. See Dale, supra note 19, at 35-36.
69. BANKING LAW art. 47, Law No. 59 of 1981; see THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM,
supra note 57, at 196-97.
70. GAIKOKU SHOKEN GYOSHA NI KANSURU HoRITSU [LAW CONCERNING FOREIGN
SECURITIES DEALERS], Law No. 5 of 1971.
71. TATEWAKI, supra note 40, at 157-60.
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In addition to these private and semiprivate institutions, there are
two government banks, namely the Japan Development Bank and the
Export-Import Bank of Japan, and a number of government financial
corporations.' Finally, there are the other sectors of the financial
industry: the life and casualty insurance companies, various forms of
nonbanks, and the banking industry's greatest rival in the current
reform movement, the securities industry.73
Each of these various types of financial institutions has its own
prerogatives, its own customer base, and its own interest in seeing
reform proceed or stagnate. This heterogeneity of interests has proven
to be an obstacle to the development of new financial products and
other changes in the past, and will be the most difficult hurdle for
reformers to traverse in the future. In the words of the Financial
Reform Council:
[I]n Japan, various restrictions and customs stemming from the
existing vertical division system have impeded the development of
new financial products and services.... [U]nder the existing system,
even if a new product is developed involving multiple financial
sectors, its offer... tends to be restrained since this gives rise to
confrontation between sectors.74
2. The Regulatory Regime. Most types of depository institutions
are regulated by the Ministry of Finance.75 Apart from controlling
entry into the banking business, the MOF exercises administrative
guidance over established banks in three main ways: (1) it controls the
ability of banks to branch domestically and abroad; (2) it grants the
appropriate licenses required for some of the activities in which banks
are allowed to engage;76 and (3) it makes numerous decisions
regarding the daily conduct of the banking business (e.g., the scope of
activities permitted through associated businesses).' The terms of
the financial laws themselves provide the MOF with a broad range of
discretionary powers. For example, the first sixteen articles of the
Banking Law contain no less than twenty provisions that delegate
72. BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 34.
73. See THE JAPANESE FiNANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 57, at 166-68.
74. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 14. Such conflicts, for example, have led to a variety
of restrictions being imposed on the private placement of bonds and the sales of commercial
paper and housing loan mortgage trusts. Id
75. See BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 37.
76. One increasingly important area of banking activity which requires licensing by the MOF
is dealing in government securities. Id at 64-65.
77. Id at 43-52.
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discretionary authority to the MOF or the government.78 Given its
broad powers over banks, the MOF has been able to keep troubled
financial institutions from going bankrupt by encouraging other banks
to deposit funds with the institution or by promoting the merger of
weak banks with strong ones.79
Banks are also subject to control by the Bank of Japan. As
Japan's central bank, the BOJ controls the official discount rate, sets
reserve deposit requirements, and participates directly in financial
markets as part of its fiscal policy.' Unlike central banks in most
countries, the BOJ is able to control directly the lending volume of
major financial institutions through what is known as window
guidance.8 ' Both the MOF and the BOJ have also been granted a
variety of powers to inspect and investigate banks and other financial
institutions.'
In addition to the MOF's Banking Bureau and the BOJ, a host of
other government bodies exercise some degree of regulatory authority
over the financial system. The Securities Bureau of the MOF controls
the securities companies and administers the Securities Transaction
Law.' The MOF also has a Finance Bureau, which is responsible for
issuing government bonds,'l and an International Finance Bureau,
which together with the Banking and Securities Bureaus exercises
control over the foreign financial activities of Japanese companies."
In addition to the MOF, local government entities exercise some
control over credit cooperatives and other small institutions.' The
78. BANKING LAW arts. 1-16, Law No. 59 of 1981. Examples include: bank licensing (art.
4), minimum capitalization requirements (art. 5), branch establishment restriction (art. 8), and
caps on loans to a single person (art. 13). Id
79. See, eg., S.L. Bachman, Japanese Banks Eager to Make "Love Match," CIi. TRIB., Apr.
7, 1991, at 8B.
80. BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 20-22.
81. Id. at 22.
82. Id. at 47.
83. See id at 44, 64-65.
84. Rosenbluth, supra note 43, at 72.
85. See Koichi Hamada & Akiyoshi Horiuchi, The Political Economy of the Financial
Market, 1 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN 223,254 (Kozo Yamamura & Yasukichi Yasuba eds.,
1987). This is the so-called "three bureaus guidance" which began in 1974. Id. The guidance
favored activities of securities firms to those of banks' overseas securities subsidiaries. See id.
But see Shoken no gaitame kisei kanwa, NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, Dec. 15, 1992, at 7 (reporting
recent abolishment of the guidance at the same time as the lifting of the restriction on securities
firms' foreign exchange business).
86. See, eg., LAW CONCERNING THE FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES OF COOPERATIVE
ORGANIZATIONS art. 7, Law No. 183 of 1949 (allocating the administrative jurisdiction between
local governments and the MOF).
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Ministry of Labor exercises joint control with the MOF over the labor
banks,' and other ministries have authority over credit cooperatives
within their jurisdictions.' The Ministry of Post and Telecommunica-
tions controls the vast postal savings system, the world's largest
depository institution. 9 The Ministry of International Trade and
Industry regulates the nonbanks. The Fair Trade Commission
(FTC) is charged with enforcing the limitations set forth by the
Antimonopoly Law on the securities holdings of banks and other
financial institutions.9' There is also a deposit insurance corporation,
though the statute which brought it into being grants it few regulatory
powers. 2 Even this picture is far from complete, but it should suffice
to illustrate the maze of regulation to which financial institutions are
subject.
III. THE GROWING NEED FOR REFORM
If Japan's spectacular postwar economic development is an
indicator, the policy of squeezing consumers in order to secure capital
for industries through a compartmentalized and highly regulated
financial system has been extremely successful. Many banks have also
become extremely rich in the process.' Times have changed,
however, and Japan's financial system has now evolved into one where
a plethora of inefficient and uncompetitive specialized financial sectors,
subject to a heterogeneous regulatory scheme, are actually hampering
87. WVORKERS' BANKING INSITUTION LAW art. 6, Law No. 227 of 1953 (stating that a labor
bank must be licensed by the Ministers of both Finance and Labor).
88. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries has regulatory
authority over the trust activities of forestry cooperatives. SHmN KUMIAT HO [FORESTRY
COOPERATIVES LAW] art. 10, Law No. 36, 1978.
89. See Hayato Yokota, Massive Money Shift Alarms Banks, NIKKEI WKLY., Nov. 9, 1991,
at 1.
90. Rowley, supra note 60, at 36.
91. ANTIMONOpOLY LAw art. 11, Law No. 540 of 1947. In addition to being able to make
exceptions to these strictures, the FTC is responsible for ensuring that businesses, including
financial institutions, do not engage in anticompetitive or unfair activities. Id. art. 27(2). The
FTC was established under Article 27 of the Antimonopoly Law and charged with the power to
control monopolistic behavior and unfair trading practices. Id.
92. Japan's Deposit Insurance Corporation has a very small staff and is charged with
administering the collection of deposit premiums. See YoKIN HOKEN HO [DEPOSrr INSURANCE
LAW] art. 34, Law No. 34 of 1971. The fact that until very recently not a single claim had ever
been made on the deposit insurance company indicates how protective the MOF is of financial
institutions. See BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 32.
93. See generally Gunter Dufey, The Role of Japanese Financial Institutions Abroad, in
JAPANESE FINANCIAL GROWTH 132, 132-54 (Charles Goodhart & George Sutija eds., 1990)
(describing growth of Japanese banks in international markets).
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Japan's development as a world financial center. 4 This section will
examine the factors which have made financial reform vital, both for
the continued well-being of the economy and for the survival of the
increasingly troubled banking industry.
The Financial System Research Council approached the subject of
financial reform from three different perspectives: the international-
ization of finance, the needs of users, and the maintenance of financial
order.' They also considered reform in the light of changes in
Japan's financial markets, including the liberalization and securitization
of finance.' Each of these issues has been a significant factor in the
development of the need for financial reform.'
By the 1970s banks began to hit the limits of growth in traditional
areas of business." The change to a floating currency exchange rate
and the oil shocks of the mid-1970s brought about drastic changes in
the demands on the financial system." Furthermore, as Japan's
export driven economy boomed and its consistent trade surplus
brought increasing amounts of foreign capital into the country, the
capital shortages ceased to be a problem."°c As noted by the Bank-
ing Report, "[t]he structural changes and stable growth that have taken
root in the Japanese economy are accompanied by a shift from a
shortage of funds to a surplus of funds today."'01 By the mid-1980s
Japan had become the world's largest creditor nation, and as a result
Japan's financial system had become increasingly tied to the rest of the
world."° These developments created four sources of pressure for
financial reform: the increasing public debt; the internationalization
of Japanese finance at home and abroad; the securitization and
94. See Holloway, supra note 18, at 54.
95. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 16.
96. Id. at 12-13; see Zadankai: Kin'ya seido no atarashii tenkai [Round Table Discussion:
New Developments in the Financial System], 966 JURISTo 12, 13 (1990) [hereinafter Round Table
Discussion 2].
97. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.
98. Rosenbluth, supra note 43, at 68.
99. See THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 57, at 25.
100. See Ryutaro Komiya & Motoshige Itoh, Japan's International Trade and Trade Policy,
1955-1984, in 2 THE JAPANESE POLrICAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN 173, 188 (Takashi Inoguchi &
Daniel I. Okimoto eds., 1988). Japan's international assets, the bulk of which may be found in
the United States, stood at U.S. $180.4 billion by the end of 1986. Yoichi Shinkai, The
Internationalization of Finance in Japan, in 2 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN 249, 249
(Takashi Inoguchi & Daniel L Okimoto eds., 1988).
101. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.
102. Shinkai, supra note 100, at 249, 255-57.
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diversification of Japanese finance; and the hard times recently
experienced by banks.
A. The Increasing Public Debt
According to the Banking Report, "banks are now involved in a
range of securities businesses relating to public bonds."'"3  A
combination of slow growth resulting from the oil shocks, a drop in tax
revenues exacerbated by the economic slowdown, 4 and a significant
increase in public expenditures"5 increasingly forced the government
to rely on deficit financing through the issuance of long-term
bonds." The great majority of government bonds were issued
through a syndicate, of which many banks and some other financial
institutions were members.' 7 The government used a syndicate
because it enabled the government to issue debt at below-market
interest rates."° The banks acquiesced because it allowed them to
preempt the government from issuing short-term debt which would
have competed with their savings accounts.' 9
Originally, the members of the syndicate would hold onto the
bonds until maturity" 0 or wait for the BOJ to repurchase them,
which it usually did."' Initially, nobody wanted the bonds to be sold
to the general public; banks did not want to have to sell bonds which
might compete with their own financial products, and the MOF did not
want the market forces to raise the interest rates that the government
would have to offer." The continual growth in the quantity of these
103. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 17.
104. EMMOTr, supra note 20, at 94; TATEWAKI, supra note 40, at 28; Yukio Noguchi, Public
Finance, in 1 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN 186, 192 (Kozo Yamamura & Yasukichi
Yasuba eds., 1987).
105. Near the end of the 1960s, the Japanese people had reached the limits of their ability
to tolerate the industrial pollution, poor infrastructure, and squalid living conditions that were the
by-product of industrial growth. By the beginning of the 1970s, these problems had forced the
government to increase spending on public works and welfare programs. See EDWIN 0.
REISCHAUER, JAPAN: THE STORY OF A NATION 334-38 (3d ed. 1970).
106. Shinkai, supra note 100, at 251-52. Deficit financing was not legally possible until the
amendment of the Public Finance Law in 1975. Masazo Ohkawa, Government Bonds, in PUBLIC
FINANCE IN JAPAN 123, 125 (Tokue Shibata ed., 2d ed. 1986); see also Noguchi, supra note 104,
at 192-95 (discussing legal and economic aspects of deficit financing).
107. BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 118.
108. Rosenbluth, supra note 43, at 68.
109. Id. at 69.
110. See EMMOwT, supra note 20, at 94.
111. Id. At one point the BOJ was repurchasing 90 percent of the bonds within one year of
their issue. Rosenbluth, supra note 43, at 69.
112. Rosenbluth, supra note 43, at 69.
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bonds, however, forced the government to allow banks to resell
them."3 This was necessary not only to make the bonds available to
a broader market but to continue receiving the cooperation of the
banks.14  Otherwise, the banks would have been burdened with an
intolerable load of illiquid assets.115
By 1975 the bond issuance had exceeded the syndicate's ability to
absorb it, and a secondary market developed spontaneously. 6 In
1978 the banks were still dissatisfied enough with the syndicate
arrangement to boycott it altogether."7 After much negotiation
between the government, the banks, and the securities industry, the
new Banking Law was enacted in 1981, allowing banks to sell public
bonds."8 Still, the burgeoning government debt was already causing
other changes in the financial markets."9 Government debt was a
significant factor both in banks' gradual expansion into new financial
products and in the development of more sophisticated investment
113. See id at 80; THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 57, at 178. Initially, the
sale of government bonds on the open market was prohibited. BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9,
at 17.
114. See Rosenbluth, supra note 43, at 74.
115. See id. at 70-74. In 1978, city banks lost V400 billion on bond holdings. Id. at 74. Banks
even lost money during the one-year waiting period before the BOJ repurchased the bonds. See
id at 72-74.
116. Id. at 73.
117. Id- at 74.
118. See id. at 80; BANKING LAW art. 10(2), Law No. 59 of 1985. It was not until the end of
1982 that the MOF provided guidance on licensing banks to engage in the securities business with
the GINKO TOU NO SHOKEN GYOMU NI KANSURU SHOREI, Ministry of Finance Ordinance No.
62 of 1982. Actual sales of government bonds to the public by banks did not begin until April
1983, and it was not until 1984 that banks were allowed to deal in government bonds (i.e., buy
and sell outstanding bonds in the marketplace). THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note
57, at 91-92.
119. One commentator noted:
Once a large secondary market in long-term securities (government bonds) had
developed, investing institutions also wanted a larger and freer short-term money market
in order to diversify their holdings and to ensure that they could raise money quickly.
So the Bank of Japan eased its control of interest rates in the call money (very short-
term cash) and bill discount markets, and allowed banks to issue yen certificates of
deposit. On the back of the government bond market grew a market for gensaki, similar
to bond repurchase agreements or repos in the United States.... This market thus
allows institutions to borrow short-term money against their long-term bond holdings.
More important still, they can invest that money in other short-term securities if the
interest rates available are higher, or vice versa. Such arbitrage opportunities forced
interest rates to move freely in associated markets; if the Bank of Japan tried to hold
rates in one market artificially low, institutions could (and did) simply move their money
elsewhere.
EMMOTr, supra note 20, at 94.
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opportunities at home and abroad."2 Reform became necessary to
reflect the shift by banks away from traditional banking activities.
B. The Internationalization of Japanese Finance at Home and
Abroad
In something of an understatement, the Banking Report notes that
"it is necessary to acknowledge the international position of the
Japanese financial and capital markets." '' As Japan's industries
developed in the 1960s, they began to establish plants and branches
overseas." Japan's banks followed in order to provide their custom-
ers with financing and other services." The oil shock provided
further opportunities for Japanese banks overseas:
In the 1970s, a large volume of "oil money" entered the
Euromarkets in the wake of the rise in crude oil prices. This money
was used to provide loans to the nonoil producers among the
developing nations. Japanese banks participated in Euromarket
syndicate loans through their overseas branches. At this time they
were particularly eager to develop their international divisions
because the 1973 oil shock had stunted the country's economic
growth and cut private-sector demand for funds for capital spend-
ing.124
Although the days of Euromarket syndicate loans were relatively short,
Japanese banks had become players in the world financial markets.'
As the country's foreign exchange reserves swelled, Japanese capital
began to flow overseas." Moreover, the meteoric rise in the value
of the yen following the 1985 Group of Five Plaza Agreement was
followed by a comparable surge in the value of Japanese assets.27
Thus, by the mid-1980s Western observers noted Japanese money
120. See id, "As of March 1988, securities accounted for 14.1% of total bank assets, and
government bonds accounted for 27.4% of this." BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 64.
121. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 15.
122. BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 73.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 74.
125. See id.
126. See EMMOTT, supra note 20, at 135-40. During the period 1981-1987, Japan's net
external assets rose from 1 percent of its GDP to 12 percent. John Forsyth, The Future of
Japanese Financial Development, in JAPANESE FINANCIAL GROWTH 175,177 (Charles Goodhart
& George Sutija eds., 1990).
127. See EMMOTT, supra note 20, at 5; Koichi Hamada & Hugh T. Patrick, Japan and the
International Monetary Regime, in 2 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN 108,122 (Takashi Inoguchi
& Daniel L Okimoto eds., 1988).
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"sweep[ing] over the world."'" This was accompanied by a dramatic
increase in the wealth and the overseas presence of Japan's banks,"9
which attained major positions in the United States as a result of
Japan's comparatively low capital-adequacy requirements.'"
This was not an entirely positive development. As Japanese
money spread around the world, complaints of Japanese economic
imperialism begin to appear. 3 At the same time, an increasing
number of foreign financial institutions came to Japan seeking to
participate in its financial success. 32  When they arrived, they found
the administrative maze and the numerous unwritten rules impenetra-
ble and thus were generally unsuccessful.133 Although the Banking
Report itself baldly states that foreign institutions "enjoy national
treatment, '"" foreign criticism of the discriminatory nature of
Japan's financial system and the unfair advantage it gives Japanese
banks abroad became increasingly harsh.135 This has become a
source of friction between Japan, the United States, and other
128. Richard Holloway, Awaiting the Second Tsunami, FAR E. ECON. REv., Dec. 17, 1987,
at 59.
129. For example, according to one survey, no Japanese banks were counted among the
world's ten largest in 1980. World Banking: Banks Meet the Marketplace, TIME TO LEAVE (Supp.
at 3, 4), in ECONOMIST, May 2, 1992. In contrast, by 1990, six of the ten largest banks, including
the top four, were Japanese. Id. By 1986 Japanese banks had acquired over 20 percent of the
banking assets in California; in addition, 1986 marked the year that Sumitomo Bank acquired a
15 percent holding in Goldman Sachs. CLYDE V. PREsTOwrrz, JR., TRADING PLACES: How
AMERICA ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKE Tim LEAD 12 (1988). This presence has not been limited
to the United States. See, e.g., Nigel Holloway, Global Ambitions, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 1,
1989, at 59 (reporting on a Japanese bank buying a stake in a London merchant bank). Nor has
it been limited to the large city banks; by the end of the 1980s, many of the smaller regional
banks had established branches in the United States. Bruce Aronson, Regionals Are Playing
Follow-the-Client, AM. BANKER, July 27, 1990, at 16A.
130. See PRESTowrrz, JR., supra note 129, at 324.
131. See EMMOTr, supra note 20, at 137.
132. By March 1988, eighty-one foreign banks had a presence in Japan. BANKING SYSTEM,
supra note 9, at 24.
133. Despite some of them having been in Japan for a decade or more, by 1986 foreign
financial institutions accounted for only 3 percent of the business done in Japan. PRESTowrTz,
JR., supra note 129, at 12.
134. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 28.
135. See eg., John Evans,JapaneseJuggernaut Slackens Its Pace, AM. BANKER, July 26,1991,
at 6A (noting United States' criticism of Japan's interest rate controls); Fumio Okamoto, MOF
Ready to Unveil Financial Decontrols, JAPAN ECON. J., May 19, 1990, at 1, 34 (listing United
States' criticisms of Japanese financial practices); Robert C. Pozen, Is America Being Shut Out
Again?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1993, § 3, at 13 (criticizing Japanese application process for lacking
"clear objective criteria for approval"); Teresa S. Robinson, Greater Access to Japan's Financial
Markets Sought, UPI, Nov. 20,1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. United States
lawmakers' dissatisfaction crystallized into the proposed Fair Trade in Financial Services Act.
James R. Kraus, Senate Bill Spurs Japanese Concern, AM. BANKER, Mar. 28, 1990, at 10.
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countries, which explains the Banking Report's expression of concern
that "it is desirable that the Japanese financial system be one that is
easy to use for foreign financial institutions.',
136
Once the capital shortage ended, many of the structures which had
emerged in response to it began to collapse.37 As Japan internation-
alized, Japanese companies discovered that, rather than cope with the
outmoded regulations and expense involved in raising capital at home,
it was often cheaper to raise capital in foreign markets.138 According
to one observer: "[B]eginning roughly in 1984-85, companies ...
deserted the banks. Money was cheaper elsewhere. At first, they
went to the bond markets, especially offshore ones.... [Then] firms
switched to equity.'' 139  As Japanese investors became increasingly
sophisticated, they realized that they could get better value for their
yen abroad, where interest rates were higher and they had more
options."4 As noted by the Banking Report:
In the environment of internationalization of [the] economy and
advancement of financial techniques... corporations are now able
to determine in which markets to invest and to procure capital,
strictly based on such factors as profitability of the financial products
offered in the world markets and the convenience of each mar-
ket.141
This resulting capital flight has threatened to "hollow out" sectors of
Japan's economy.42 Reform was therefore necessary to make
136. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 28.
137. See, e.g., RODNEY CLARK, THE JAPANESE COMPANY 80 (1979) (predicting that "[i]n the
longer run the coherence of bank groups is further threatened by the prospect that capital will
no longer be in short supply, and that other sources of capital than the domestic banks, notably
the stock exchange at home and banks and underwriters from abroad, will become relatively more
important") (emphasis added).
138. See Goso-sendan, supra note 37, at 7. For example, in Japan issuance fees for corporate
bonds are at least 10 percent higher than those in Europe. In addition, fees charged by banks
for issuance in Japan are as much as fifteen times higher than those charged by European banks.
Atsushi Naoi, Bond Fees in Japan Down Yet High, NIKKEI WKLY., Aug. 3, 1991, at 14.
139. The New State of Corporate Japan, A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (Supp. at
32), in ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 1991.
140. The fact that a tide of Japanese money began sweeping the world in the 1980s is itself
indicative of the limited options for investment within Japan. See generally Holloway, supra note
128, at 59-61 (describing both the massive Japanese foreign investment and the inconvenience
of Japan's domestic market). One scholar regards Japanese corporations' access to competitive
markets overseas as "the single most important stimulus toward financial deregulation in Japan."
Rosenbluth, supra note 43, at 102.
141. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.
142. See i& at 14.
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Japanese financial markets globally competitive, while at the same time
making these markets more accessible to foreign investors and
institutions.
C. The Securitization and Diversification of Japanese Finance
"In recent years, the fund raising of large- and medium-size
corporations has shifted from bank loans to the issue of securities. 143
This comment from the Banking Report reflects the fact that, within
Japan, increasingly sophisticated investors and companies began
turning away from the banks and seeking alternatives to the banks'
outdated products and unfavorable interest rates.1" Since the 1970s
securities, over which securities companies had been granted a virtual
monopoly, became an increasingly attractive alternative for firms
attempting to reduce their bank debt in the post-oil-shock world. 45
Japanese firms' financial activities paralleled their dealings overseas in
becoming progressively more sophisticated. Not only were they raising
capital for their own purposes in foreign markets, they also started to
get involved in financing as a business." Most of this financial
activity involved securities which, despite being issued overseas, were
generally purchased by Japanese investors and handled by Japanese
securities firms.147 This shift greatly benefitted the securities firms.148
Furthermore, according to the Banking Report in 1991, "there is
a trend among individuals toward more diversified asset invest-
ments." '149 The phenomenal Japanese savings rate, another crucial
143. Id. at 12.
144. For example, the special status of the postal savings network enables it to offer interest
rates and services with which banks are incapable of competing. See Yokota, supra note 89, at
1. In the first seven months of 1991, 4 trillion was transfered from banks to post office accounts,
a trend which bankers fear may upset the whole financial system. Id.
145. See Rosenbluth, supra note 43, at 71. Although the relationship between banks and
corporations is still close, the roles have been reversed: banks often cater to a corporation in the
hope that the corporation will use their services. See EMMoTP, supra note 20, 104. There are
indicators that banks and corporations may become further alienated: it has been reported that
at least one bank is selling its stable shares. Paul Blustein, Japanese Bank Breaks Tradition, May
Sell Long-Held Shares, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1991, at C10. This may simply be a sign of
desperation, however, rather than the beginning of any general trend. Id. at C16.
146. For example, almost 40 percent of Toyota's pretax profits in 1988 were derived from
financial activities rather than car manufacturing. EMMOTr, supra note 20, at 104.
147. Id. In order to compensate banks, the MOF allowed them to underwrite corporate
securities overseas, although they are still unable to do so in Japan. Id. at 105.
148. Id. at 104.
149. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 13.
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factor in the formation of Japan's massive capital surplus," ° has
gradually begun to decrease since the 1970s.'5 Social welfare system
improvements and growing confidence in the economy correspondingly
reduced the incentive to save. 5 An increasing variety of things to
do with one's money, besides put it in the bank, also arose: stock and
real estate investments, foreign travel, and even eating gold-flaked
sushi. These systemic changes required a parallel reform in the
regulation of the financial sectors.
D. Banks Experience Hard Times
As stated euphemistically by the Banking Report, "a significant
change has occurred in the earnings structure of Japanese banks."'53
The increasing public debt as well as the internationalization,
securitization, and diversification of Japanese finance, forced the
government gradually to deregulate interest rates'- 4 and to allow
banks to offer an increasing variety of financial products in order to
stem the flow of capital to more attractive foreign markets."
Presumably because small depositors have fewer options for invest-
ment, deregulation initially focused on large-denomination instru-
ments.5 6 Furthermore, the walls between long-term and short-term
150. The savings rate was as high as 25 percent in the 1960s. Kazuo Sato, Saving and
Investmen in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN 1, 137,140 (Kozo Yamamura & Yasuldchi
Yasuba eds., 1987). Sato asserts that "[tihe economic miracle of the 1960s owes much to the
steady rise in the saving ratio as the demand for investment steadily increased." Id. at 137. The
high savings rate during this period appears to have been the exception rather than the rule. See
id. at 140. Therefore, it should not automatically be attributed to some unique by-product of
Japanese culture and society. Id.
151. Japan's personal savings rate dropped by 7 percent between 1975 and 1985. EMMOTr,
supra note 20, at 234; see also Sato, supra note 150, at 140 (discussing the drop in the savings rate
in 1970s); THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 57, at 10-12. But see Time for a
Reagan Tax Cut-in Japan?, Bus. WY., Mar. 1, 1993, at 22 (reporting a sharp rise in personal
savings due to Japan's recent economic problems).
152. See EMMOTr, supra note 20, at 234-35. In 1988 the government also eliminated a major
tax incentive for saving. Id. at 235.
153. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 103-52. As of December 1991, 65 percent of deposits
in city banks were in accounts with unregulated interest rates. FEDERATION OF BANKERS
ASSOCIATIONS OF JAPAN, DEREGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN JAPAN 2 (1991)
[hereinafter DEREGULATION] (on file with author).
155. See DEREGULATION, supra note 154, at 2.
156. For example, in 1979 interest rates were deregulated on three to six month certificates
of deposit (CDs) over ¥500 million. In 1985, interest rates on money market certificates (MMCs)
were introduced with a minimum amount of '50 million. Tatewaki, supra note 40, at 45. Total
deregulation was supposed to be completed in 1993. Tomio Shida, Financial Industry Inches
Nearer to Deregulation, JAPAN ECON. J., Feb. 23, 1991, at 35. Deregulation of demand deposit
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banks have gradually been coming down as ordinary and long-term
credit banks began to offer increasingly similar financial services. 15 7
Similarly, the 1981 amendments to the Banking Law and to the
Securities Transaction Law permit banks to trade in public bond
options.158  As a result, banks have gradually become active in the
securities markets. Thus, over time, the distinctions between different
types of financial institutions have become increasingly irrelevant. 59
Despite having been granted these new privileges, the banks still
need to offer higher (i.e., market) interest rates while trying to remain
competitive in a stagnant loan market, thus creating a two-sided
squeeze on the banks' interest rate spread, which has recently caused
serious problems for many banks."6 Large institutions have become
increasingly predatory in attracting customers, often at the expense of
the smaller institutions."' As banks expanded into each others'
accounts, however, is not scheduled to take place until mid-1994. DEREGULATION, supra note
154, at 2.
157. Long-term credit banks are issuing two-year debentures, while regular banks have begun
offering three-year term deposits; previously, long-term credit banks had been limited to five-year
instruments, while ordinary banks were restricted to short-term financing. E.g., Tatsuo Itoh,
Japan Long-Term Banks to Launch Two-Yr Debentures, Reuter Money Report, Oct. 24, 1991,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, MONRFr File; see also New Mid-Term Time Deposits Designed, Japan
Econ. Newswire, May 19,1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, JEN File (noting that regional
banks are designing three-year to four-year time deposits).
158. See also BANKING LAW art. 10(2), Law No. 59 of 1981 (authorizing banks some
securities-related activities); SHOKEN TORIHIKI HO [SEcuRITIES TRANSACTION LAW] art.
65(2)(2)(i), Law No. 25 of 1948 (exempting banks from the total ban of securities transactions,
provided in the preceding subsection, for certain types of transactions); BANKING REPORT, supra
note 3, at 17.
159. See, eg., THE JAPANESE FNANCiAL SYSTEM, supra note 57, at 165 ("[I]t is difficult to
make very precise distinction [sic] in a functional sense among the depository institutions....
[After 1975] each type of financial institution began to invade the turf of others.").
160. See, eg., Paul Blustein, Profits Slide for Japan's Major Banks, WASH. POST, May 28,
1991, at El, E5 (discussing the narrowing gap between deposit interest and loan interest); Evans,
supra note 135, at 6A (noting that deregulation of interest rates is eroding earnings on deposits);
Joe Joseph, Japanese Bank Balance Upset, THE TIMES Nov. 2,1990, at 28 (citing smaller interest
rate spread and stock losses as sources of banks' difficulties). More recently, however, bad loans
have become the banks' main problem. See infra notes 300-01.
161. See generally Yftichi Hiraishi, Jiyaka no naka dewa ky~do soshiki kin'ya no genten ni
modore, EKONOMISUTO, July 15, 1991, at 48 (discussing the appropriate corporate strategies for
the cooperative type of financial institution in the era of liberalization and internationalization);
Masahiro Takahashi, Hokkaid6, hiroi chiiki no 'sumiwake' mo yurusarenaku natta,
EKONOMISUTO, July 15, 1991, at 38 (reporting increasing competition in Hokkaido due to the
liberalization of deposit rates and the new entry of larger banks to small-sized firms' corporate
finance market). The shinkin banks, for example, are in a serious dilemma. As explained by a
Sanwa Bank officer, "[The shinkin] cannot compete with us.... There is no limit to our ability
to take their customers away." Henny Sender, Japan's Not-So-Mighty Banks, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Nov. 1990, at 130.
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markets, reform became increasingly necessary to protect the sectors
of the financial industry which were disadvantaged by this new
competition.
In the long run, excessive economic growth may have been the
banks' principal downfall. According to the Banking Report, "[a]s a
result of liberalization and internationalization of finance, Japanese
banks and other financial institutions are confronted with a variety of
risks.... ,162 In the case of the larger banks, the expansion of their
partners in the keiretsu group eventually led to a drop in profits
because:
as a company in a bank group gets bigger two things happen. The
group bank becomes less able and less willing, for reasons of
financial prudence [there are legal restrictions as well] to provide the
growing company with most of its funds. At the same time, the
company becomes attractive as a potential borrower to a number of
outside banks. As the company borrows more from these outside
banks its relations with the group bank are attenuated....
Bank groups suffer, therefore, from an inherent defect, that the
more successful their member companies are, the less likely they are
to remain largely under the control of the central bank.16
Similarly, the dramatic rise in stock and land prices that occurred in
the 1980s hurt banks and other financial institutions. Banks had
invested heavily in stock and had financed stock and land speculation
activities of affiliates.1" Most of these loans were made with proper-
ty as collateral.1" As long as land and stock prices continued to
spiral, the underlying structural problems of the banking system went
largely unnoticed."6  When the stock and real estate markets
dropped precipitously at the beginning of the 1990s, the value of
banks' stockholdings fell rapidly,67 and they were stuck with portfo-
162. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 13.
163. CLARK, supra note 137, at 78, 80.
164. See, e.g., Steven Butler, Little Cause for Comfort, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1992, at 12.
165. See generally infra notes 300-01 and accompanying text (discussing nonperforming loans
backed by devalued real estate holdings).
166. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 164, at 12 ("What Japan's economic bureaucrats have
consistently failed to appreciate is the extent to which the heady years also distorted investment
and consumption patterns.").
167. See Evans, supra note 135, at 6A; J. Terence Gallagher, Japan Credit Crunch Could
Cause First Bank Failure, Reuter Library Report, Jan. 31, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, LBYRPT File (reporting many smaller institutions as sitting on large unrealized losses
from securities investments); infra notes 298-311 and accompanying text.
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lios of bad loans secured by severely devalued land.'6 These losses
provided a new urgency for financial reform. As noted by one
observer:
The fragmented nature of official supervision of financial institutions
in Japan has not mattered too much in the past because the
industry's overall asset structure was diversified enough to prevent
any undue concentration of risk. But all this has changed with the
massive funding of Japan's recent land and property bubble.1 69
The Banking and Securities Reports, therefore, had to cover a broad
variety of concerns: some long-standing and some arising from
relatively new developments. The degree to which these concerns
were addressed in the reports is the subject of the following section.
IV. REFORM AT LAST?
The core of the Financial System Research Council's (Council)
reform proposals involved removing the legal and regulatory barriers
between the following sectors of the financial industry: banking, long-
term banking, securities, and trust activities. Citing the worldwide
trend toward "the expanding scope of activities for financial institu-
tions,"17 the Banking Report suggested that such changes would
encourage "sufficient competition between financial institutions... in
all financial markets"'7 and enable the financial institutions to "meet
the increasingly sophisticated and diverse needs of the user .... "
The Council was also concerned with "the achievement of a level
playing field at the start of mutual entry and the avoidance of
excessive impact on existing financial institutions."' With these
quite different objectives in mind, the Banking Report discussed five
different methods by which the mutual entry of financial industries into
each other's markets could be accomplished: 74  (1) universal
168. See generally infra notes 300-01 and accompanying text (discussing nonperforming loans
secured by devalued real estate). In addition, the larger banks had also lent excessively to fund
merger and acquisitions activities in the United States during the 1980s, many of which resulted
in bankruptcies. See Sherry R. Sontag, Japan's U.S. Lesson in Bankruptcy, NAT'L L. J., Apr. 30,
1990, at 3.
169. Rowley, supra note 60, at 36.
170. BANKiNG REPORT, supra note 3, at 16.
171. I at 19 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 20.
173. Id
174. This part of the reform proposal did not surprise anybody. The Council had, after all,
been discussing the subject of financial reform for six years, and this aspect of their deliberation
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banking; (2) bank holding companies; (3) multifunctional subsidiaries;
(4) a piecemeal approach; and (5) mutual entry through wholly-owned
subsidiaries. Each of these methods is described below and is followed
by a discussion of the recommendations of the Securities Report and
the public reaction to both the Banking and Securities Reports.
A. Options for Reform
The first method for reform proposed in the Banking Report was
a universal banking system. This would have allowed financial
institutions to engage in a broad range of activities without having to
establish subsidiaries or use separate facilities.75 For example, banks
would be allowed to deal in securities and trust instruments, and
securities companies could take deposits.
Universal banking was rejected partly because it might be difficult
to achieve a level playing field.'76 This euphemistic statement
reflects the reality that large banks supported the adoption of a
universal banking system, but the securities industry and smaller banks
vehemently opposed such a system because it would have placed them
at a competitive disadvantage."l Under a universal banking system,
securities companies and the smaller and/or specialized banks with
limited numbers of branches would have been seriously handicapped
in competing with the large city banks that had branches throughout
the country.' Moreover, the securities industry insisted that strict
firewalls be maintained between different financial operations.'79
From this standpoint, a universal banking system might not have
was public knowledge at least two years before they issued their final report. See, eg., Round
Table Discussion 2, supra note 96, at 13,25-29 (discussing the implications of the various methods
of mutual entry); Holloway, supra note 18, at 54 (discussing the five possible means of mutual
entry).
175. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 21.
176. Id.
177. See Gosd-sendan, supra note 37, at 7.
178. Round Table Discussion 2, supra note 96, at 28. The long-term credit banks appear
vulnerable to any form of deregulation, and they will likely acquire regular banks in order to
obtain a network of branches through which to engage in new forms of business. See Anthony
Rowley, Marriages of Convenience, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 30, 1992, at 43.
179. See Gosi-sendan, supra note 37, at 7. One commentator has also observed that the
concern with firewalls is more about equalizing competition than preventing the inappropriate
exchange of information between parents and subsidiaries. Round Table Discussion 2, supra note
96, at 26.
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provided sufficient safeguards against conflicts of interest and self-
dealing.'80
The second option for reform was to allow mutual entry through
bank holding companies, similar to the system of the United
States. 8 This approach was not discussed at length in the Banking
Report. Article 9 of Japan's antitrust law prohibits holding compa-
nies,"s and the Council did not deem it appropriate to "seek a
revision of that law for the sake of financial system review alone. ' s183
The third approach for reform was mutual entry through
multifunctional subsidiaries."s  This plan would involve different
institutions participating in each other's fields of business through a
special type of subsidiary."8 While this method would have synergis-
tic advantages and would enhance user benefits, the Banking Report
expressed some concerns about conflicts of interest and self-deal-
ing.es' These concerns were similar to those about universal banking
and made the multifunctional subsidiary approach less attractive than
mutual entry through separate subsidiaries."
The fourth method for reform was a piecemeal approach, using
"desegregation in individual areas of business, while leaving intact the
existing regulations that otherwise segregate different types of
[financial] operations."'" Although this approach did have the
definite political merit of softening the reform's impact on the various
interests involved, the Banking Report rejected its use as an overall
180. The Banking Report gracefully concedes that "[i]n regard to the mutual entry between
banks and securities companies, the universal banking system ... has many problems at this point
in terms of maintaining sound banking management and preventing harmful conflicts of interest."
BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 21.
181. Id.
182. ANTIMONOPOLY LAW art. 9, Law No. 54 of 1947.
183. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 21.
184. Id. The Japanese version of the Banking Report refers to this option as the Tokureiho
Hoshiki ("special legislation") approach. KIN'YO SEIDO CHOSA KAI, SEMO MONDAI SENMON
IINKAi HOKOKU, reprinted in EKONOMISUTO, July 15, 1991, at 120, 130. It is difficult to discern
the reason for this discrepancy because discussion of this approach by both the Banking Report
and the media was extremely limited. Presumably, the two terms--"multifunctional subsidiaries"
and "special legislation"-together refer to subsidiaries established under new legislation with
licensing criteria and permissible activities that differ significantly from the existing types of
financial institutions.
185. Id, Foreign observers have described this form as an investment banking subsidiary
limited to wholesale activities. Holloway, supra note 18, at 54.
186. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 21.
187. Id. at 20-21.
188. Id. at 20. One commentator described this less generously as "[m]ore of the same."
Holloway, supra note 18, at 54.
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method because it "would make it difficult to pursue a consistent and
far-reaching mutual entry and would not make it possible to build an
internationally acceptable system that extensively promotes users'
benefits." '189 However, the Council did recognize that this approach,
used in combination with another method, would probably be
appropriate in specific financial sectors"9 such as for regional banks
and smaller financial institutions."
The final reform alternative, which the Council recommended in
its Banking Report after rejecting the other approaches, allowed
mutual entry through wholly-owned specialty subsidiaries." A
subsidiary approach was preferred because it presented the fewest
problems; the separate subsidiary was preferred to the multifunctional
subsidiary because it would be more effective in "prevent[ing] harmful
conflicts of interest, thus maintaining financial order."' 93 Observers
have also noted that the subsidiary method would be more effective in
preserving "fair competitive conditions" (note that these terms do not
necessarily carry the same meaning as they would in an American
context), particularly if requirements for separate business premises are
imposed. 4 Thus, the playing field is not likely to experience any
sudden drastic tilts.95 The separate subsidiary method became law
with the passage of the Financial System Reform Act of 1992."9
In detail, the Banking Report recommended that the subsidiaries
be fully established entities. As such, the subsidiaries would be fully
189. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 20. As written, the committee's reasons are not
particularly lucid. The quoted passage presumably means that partial deregulation would simply
complicate matters further and perpetuate the current system which favors the interests of
financial institutions at the expense of their users. Following publication, the most widespread
criticism of the Banking Report was that it favored the interests of financial institutions with little
regard for consumers. See Holloway, supra note 18, at 54-55; infra notes 253-54 and
accompanying text. Consequently, the reference to promoting "users' benefits" would appear to
be more for effect than out of any actual concern for users' convenience. See infra notes 325,
328-30 and accompanying text.
190. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 20.
191. Id. at 24.
192. Id. at 20-22. This method was also the only possibility mentioned by the Security
Council. See SECURrTES REPORT, supra note 3, at 162.
193. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 21.
194. Round Table Discussion 2, supra note 96, at 26-28. Several observers have pointed out
the need for a more thorough discussion of firewalls. Id.
195. Although the regulation of foreign financial institutions in Japan is a subject beyond the
scope of this paper, it must be noted at this juncture that, prior to the change in law, foreign
banks were permitted to own up to 50 percent of a Japanese securities company. Foreign Banks
to Benefit from MOF Ruling, NnKKI WKLY., June 29, 1991, at 12.
196. See infra notes 270-75 and accompanying text.
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functional entities, licensed, and entitled to complete privileges under
the appropriate laws."9 Banks should be allowed to have securities
subsidiaries and trust banking subsidiaries, securities companies should
-be able to create banking and/or trust banking subsidiaries, 198 and so
on. Neither foreign exchange nor long-term banking subsidiaries were
discussed, having been dismissed as largely redundant."9 Still, the
Banking Report left open the subject of long-term credit banking
subsidiaries "for reasons such as achieving continuity with the existing
system."" At the same time, the Banking Report recognized that
there was a need to maintain an orderly deregulation, and for this
reason it suggested placing certain provisional restrictions on the scope
of activities permitted to some types of subsidiaries. 21 Specifically,
while banking subsidiaries ought to be fully empowered, trust
subsidiaries should be excluded from doing some types of trust
business and possibly be limited to conducting real estate trust
activities. Securities subsidiaries should be given all the powers
allowed under the Securities Transaction Law, but should be tempo-
rarily excluded from brokering and other activities in the secondary
market'2 3 The Council saw little merit in embodying these limita-
tions in law because doing so "could result in creating new types of
financial sectors, which would run counter to the objectives of the
system review.""2 4
The Council also recognized that it might be economically
impossible for regional financial institutions to set up subsidiaries. 05
197. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 22.
198. Id. In reality, mutual entry is likely to be fairly one-sided; that is, banks going into the
securities business. The banking subsidiary of a securities firm would be hindered by the
difficulty of establishing the network of branches that would be necessary to take deposits
successfully. Sh5torishin saishil hokoku an: Kankeisha wa k6 mint, ASAHI SHINBUN, May 16,
1991, at 8. Similar economic considerations would restrict securities firms from entering the trust
business as well. See Ozume kin'yiZ seido kaikaku 3: Danko hantai no uragawa, shOkenkal ni
tadayou kyodatsukan, YOMIU SHINBUN, May 11, 1991, at 7 (describing the fear in the securities
industry of facing banks' new entry into the securities business).
199. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 22.
200. Id Some view the breakdown of the distinction between long-term and short-term
financing as a threat to the continued existence of the long-term credit bank system. Ozume
kin'ya seido kaikaku 3: Danko hantai no uragawa, shakenkai ni tadayo kyodatsukan, supra note
198, at 7.
201. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 23.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 22.
205. Id. at 24. In addition to the regional banks, other "regional financial institutions"
include the numerous smaller institutions such as credit associations, farm cooperatives, etc. Id.
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For this reason and to benefit local users, the Banking Report
suggested that regional financial institutions be allowed to choose
between establishing subsidiaries and expanding the scope of some of
their own activities on a more limited basis.'°6 The Banking Report
clearly deferred the difficult question of what special dispensation
should be granted to regional institutions. It stated that the activities
allowed to regional institutions should "be those which are necessary
for meeting the needs of local users and for supporting the develop-
ment of the region, and which pose virtually no problems in maintain-
ing financial order when undertaken by regional financial institutions
themselves."'  This rather nebulous statement is followed by two
examples of such activities: land trusts and charitable trusts.2° But
again, the Banking Report did not make any definite recommenda-
tions.
In addition to proposing the basic format by which mutual entry
should be accomplished, the Banking Report made several other
recommendations. First, it proposed broadening the scope of activities
in which banks could engage without being required to establish a
subsidiary, focusing primarily on loosening the restrictions on
banks' involvement in private bond placements and various "securitiza-
tion-related" products.210 Second, the Banking Report hinted at
possibly allowing banks to deal in domestic corporate bonds and
freeing them to issue bonds of their own.2 ' Third, the Banking
Report recommended an immediate review of many regulations and
practices which it did not specifically address.2
The Council recognized that any form of major change in the
financial system was likely to be traumatic for all the parties involved.
The Banking Report concluded, however, that the combination of the
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. Doubtless, the functions in which regional financial institutions eventually will be
allowed to participate will not be those that the users need, but rather those that other types of
institutions are willing to concede.
209. 1& at 20-21.
210. Id. at 23.
211. See id. at 24. The report also equivocated on the question of allowing securities
companies to engage directly in foreign exchange activities. Id. at 23-24. It is conceivable that
several questions such as these were deliberately brought up, then left unanswered, in order to
provide bargaining chips for future disputes between the various industries.
212. Id. at 25. Examples of recommended regulations include further liberalization of interest
rates and the diversification of trust products and bank debentures. Id.
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subsidiary format, existing laws, and institutional self-regulation would
suffice to prevent "harmful side effects of mutual entry."'
To supplement the existing regime, the Council proposed four
additional areas of reform.214 First, it proposed instituting higher
capitalization levels in order to "attain sound management." '215
Adherence to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) capitaliza-
tion standards had been discussed in Japan for several years,216 and
the Banking Report formally proposed "further studies" regarding
making it the legal standard.2 7 In the case of subsidiaries, the
Banking Report suggested examining the feasibility of consolidating
the capital-adequacy requirements of parents and subsidiaries,2 1 1 as
is the practice in other countries. 2 9  Second, the Banking Report
mentioned the need to reinforce the disclosure system, although it did
not provide any details.' Third, it suggested that the monitoring
function of supervisory authorities should be improved, particularly
with regard to risk management, given the various transactions in
which banks may become involved after liberalization z  Fourth, the
Banking Report briefly recommended improving the deposit insurance
system.' Finally, the Banking Report made some brief observations
and suggestions regarding foreign financial institutions, the insurance
industry, nonbanks, governmental financial institutions, and coopera-
tive financial institutions.P The extent to which the Banking
213. Id. at 26.
214. Id. at 26-27.
215. Id. at 27.
216. See eg.,Japan's Banking Uncertainties, ECONOMIST, June 30,1990, at 75 (discussing the
possibility of BIS requirements for reporting large scale bank mergers). The so-called BIS
Accord of 1988 proposes a minimum capital-to-risk weighted assets ratio of 8 percent for
internationally active banks. Roy Goode, The Insolvency Implications for Banks, in THE SINGLE
MARKET AND THE LAW OF BANKING 139, 141-42 (Ross Cranston ed., 1991); Henry Hu, Swaps:
The Modem Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 333 n.28 (1989).
217. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 27. To date, capital-adequacy requirements have
been set by the government. BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 40-41; Finance Ministry May
Push for Rule on Bank Ratio, NIKKEI WKLY., July 27, 1991, at 3. Since the Report was issued,
however, the MOF proposed making BIS's capital-adequacy standards a statutory requirement.
See Capital Adequacy Standards Proposed as Law, NIKKEI WKLY., Nov. 30, 1991, at 4.
218. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 27.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 28.
223. Id. at 28-30.
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Council's recommendations were reflected in the Financial System
Reform Act is discussed in Part V.
B. The Securities Report
In contrast to the Banking Report, the Securities Report was
shorter and much less equivocating in its demands. Unlike the
Banking Report, which had to reflect the delicate balance of interests
of various types of banks, the Securities Report was primarily
concerned with limiting the encroachment of banks into securities
companies' domain to a bearable minimum.
Described briefly, the Securities Report contained three main
ideas on the subject of financial reform.2 4  First, the Securities
Report advocated that the term "security" be given an all-encompass-
ing, American-style definition in order to bring a broader range of
financial products under the ambit of the Securities Transaction
Law.' The Securities Report suggested that new "securitization
products" should be classified as securities in order to protect investors
and enhance the distribution of securities.' Securities could only be
sold by licensed dealers, and banks were prohibited from direct
dealings in most securities.' Consequently, broadening ihe ambit
of what constituted a security would have given the securities industry
a comparative advantage over banks by expanding the role of
securities in Japan's capital markets.' Although banks would have
been able to deal in securities through subsidiaries, a broad definition
of securities still would have benefitted the securities industry in three
ways. It would have completely blocked smaller banks, which could
not afford the expense of establishing a subsidiary for securities
dealings, with the possible exception of participation in private
placements. Furthermore, banks' securities subsidiaries would have
been temporarily limited in the scope of their securities activities,'
and therefore be less competitive. Finally, through the redefinition of
"security," it would have been possible to shut banks out of existing
224. MOF Market Reforms a Long Way Off; Flap over Securities Plan Slows Progress, Int'l
Fin. Daily (BNA), June 7, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAIFD File.
225. See SECtURIms REPORT, supra note 3, at 155-56.
226. SeekL
227. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
228. See SECuRr' Es REPORT, supra note 3, at 155.
229. See infra notes 263-348 and accompanying text.
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product markets in which they were already involved, such as the
burgeoning commercial paper market.
Second, the Securities Report called for a revision of the concept
of what constitutes a public offering. ' The classification of a
transaction as a public offering triggers disclosure obligations.'2
Under the preamendment definition, any invitation to acquire
securities made to a number of unspecified persons on equal terms was
regarded as a public offering' 3 The Securities Report argued that
a variety of transactions made with informed investors should not be
considered public offerings and hence excluded from disclosure
requirements and other protective regulations.m ' While this proposal
did not have direct relevance to banking reform, it appears to have
represented an effort by the securities industry to make securities, and
thus securities companies, more accessible to investors.
Third, the Securities Report discussed the entry of banks into the
securities business in a section euphemistically titled "Deliberations on
Market Intermediaries."'' 5 Given the increasing variety of securities-
related products, the Report conceded that "it is possible that, in
certain exceptions, depending upon the type of securitization product,
cases may develop where it may be appropriate to allow persons not
engaged in the securities business to act as a market intermediary."' 6
It also conceded that banks should be allowed to participate in private
placements.'' The Securities Report even bowed to the inevitability
of banks entering the securities market through subsidiaries.2?8
At this point, however, the Securities Report became less
accommodating. It listed a number of specific concerns regarding the
increased involvement of banks in the securities industry. These
include: banks' safety and soundness, conflicts of interest, self-dealing,
and the possibility of banks acquiring undue influence over companies
230. See Round Table Discussion 2, supra note 96, at 23. The Securities Report does indicate
that it would be appropriate to allow banks to continue dealing in commercial paper and
certificates of deposit, even if they are reclassified as securities. SECURITIS REPORT, supra note
3, at 161. However, this issue clearly provides the leverage for future bartering with the banks
over the details of the reform.
231. SECURITIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 158.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. An example of transactions which should be exempted from disclosure requirements
are offerings made to less than fifty persons. Id.
235. Id. at 161.
236. Id. (author's translation).
237. Id.
238. See id. at 163.
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and the marketplace. 39  In order to prevent such negative side
effects, the Securities Report made two proposals. First, it advised
that mutual entry be a gradual process to prevent market confu-
sion.2' In particular, it recommended the creation of a legal prohibi-
tion on banks engaging in brokerage activities.241 Second, although
it did not use the term directly, the Securities Report called for an
extremely strict system of firewalls to compartmentalize risk and
prevent self-dealing.242  If fully implemented, this network of
firewalls would have negated much of the benefit which banks or other
financial institutions might have hoped to derive from establishing a
securities subsidiary.24 3
C. The Impact of the Reports
Both the Banking Report and the Securities Report were highly
criticized. This criticism can be divided into three issues: (1) that the
Reports failed to advocate true, meaningful reform; (2) that the
substance of the Reports ignored some of the supposed goals of
reform; and (3) that those proposals the Reports did make were too
vague with respect to the details of reform.2' Although both
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 164. This is one area where the recommendations of the Securities Report diverge
from those of the Banking Report, which advocates only informal restrictions. Compare id. with
BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 18-19. The intent of the Securities Report is clear: once in
place, a statutory prohibition on brokering by banks would be both harder to circumvent and far
more difficult to remove than a mere regulatory understanding. See generally Round Table
Discussion 1, supra note 3, at 87 (commentators agreeing it will take a long time before the
restriction on brokering by banks is finally lifted).
242. See SECURITIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 163. The call for firewalls is not addressed
solely to banks but to any parent subsidiary relationship where one entity is a securities company.
See e.g., Round Table Discussion 1, supra note 3, at 90-92 (discussing the firewall issue in
general).
243. See Round Table Discussion 1, supra note 3, at 90-92. Doubtless this is precisely what
the securities industry wanted. See Ozume kin'ya seido kaikaku 3: Danko hantai no uragawa,
shokenkai ni tadayou kyodatsukan, supra note 198, at 7. Some of the proposed firewalls reflect
legitimate concerns, such as a parent making imprudent investments in order to prop up a failing
securities subsidiary. Other firewalls, however, appear more concerned with making securities
subsidiaries as unattractive as possible to prospective entrants into the securities business. For
example, some firewalls would prevent parent companies from granting favorable terms (e.g., for
loans) to their securities subsidiaries or their customers, parents and subsidiaries doing business
on the same premises, and interlocking directorships. Round Table Discussion 1, supra note 3,
at 90-92; see also Round Table Discussion 2, supra note 96, at 27-28 (discussing firewalls in
connection with market competition).
244. Criticism of the Reports began even before they were officially released because their
contents were known beforehand. See, e.g., Kinseicho hkoku an: Gy6kai e no hairyo yasen,
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Reports repeatedly stressed the need for more competitive financial
markets, neither provided a clear guideline, as observers had hoped,
regarding what kind of competition should be engendered on the road
to reform. Should there be completely free competition sacrificing
weak and inefficient institutions? Should competition be encouraged
only to the extent that such institutions would not be eradicated, or
should there be some intermediate alternative? 5 Although the
Banking Report briefly refers to the need for competition, stating that
"to support the present system is rather to protect the vested interests
of existing financial institutions of each sector,"' nothing within the
Report suggests that these vested interests either could or should be
seriously endangered by the proposed reforms. It is not surprising,
therefore, that some observers regarded the proposed reforms as a
continuation of the convoy system. 7 While the media generally
recognized the need to avoid excessive confusion in the process of
reform, at least one commentator felt that the MOF's concern for
kin'ya chitsujo (financial stability) was misplaced. 9 Such criticism
was hardly new; it had been made over ten years earlier, when the
Banking Law was amended in 1981,' and perhaps indicated how
little things had really changed."
YomimU~ SHiNBUN, May 22, 1991, at 7 (criticizing the Banking Report for its lack of attention
to the user's interest and the internationalization of the Japanese market).
245. See Round Table Discussion 2, supra note 96, at 27-30. Although recognizing that the
traditional Japanese concept of competition might be unique, observers noted a year before the
Report was issued that it would be necessary to consider the reform in terms of the Anglo-
European concept of competition; otherwise it would be meaningless. Id. at 30.
246. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
247. Gosd-sendan, supra note 37, at 7.
248. See eg., Ozume kin'yii seido kaikaku 3: Danko hantai no uragawa, shekenkai ni
tadayou kyodatsukan, supra note 198, at 7 (describing the need to avoid a deregulation like
Britain's "Big Bang").
249. See, e.g., Shikin chtatsu no sentaku haba hiroku, YOMIURI SHINBUN, June 14, 1991, at
7 (President of Nippon Steel stating: "I don't consider it financial stability when not a single
financial institution doesn't go bankrupt. It can't be helped if banks that invest only in land or
stray from sound management go bankrupt. While it may be necessary to strengthen the
insurance system in order to protect small investors, ... overprotectiveness is not financial
stability... ."). One observer has characterized the content of the Reports as being nothing more
than a discussion of what sort of handicaps should be imposed on city banks during the reform
process. Gink6 saihen daigappei, Tokumei zadankai. Doko ka ga kuttsukeba issei ni hashiridasu,
EKONoMIsuTO, July 15, 1991, at 16, 26 (anonymous discussion by insiders on possible bank
mergers).
250. See Rosenbluth, supra note 43, at 92-97.
251. The subsidiaries as proposed will have to be licensed by the MOF under existing laws.
See generally FNANCLAL SYSTEM REFORM Acr, supra note 5, passim (providing no amendments
to existing laws requiring financial institutions be licensed by the MOF). This provides the MOF
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A second related and common complaint was that by focusing too
much on the continued well-being of all sectors of the financial
industry the Reports neglected the two other themes supposedly
underlying the reform proposals: user needs and the internationaliza-
tion of finance3 52 Criticism that the convenience of financial con-
sumers had been neglected was particularly widespread. 3 Only a
short section of the Banking Report was devoted exclusively to user
benefits,' and, while the Securities Report purports to be greatly
with the opportunity to render the proposed reforms meaningless by refusing to grant licenses
to subsidiaries when, in its view, doing so might threaten the stability of other institutions or the
economy in general.
252. Kinseich6 hkoku an: Gyakai e no hairyo yasen, supra note 244, at 7; Sumiko Takahara,
Tanka wo Iitta to iwaretemo, ECONOMISUTO, July 15,1991, at 92; Shinichiro Ohta, Riy~sha Fuza4
Gyikai ego ni shashi shita kakine rons, ECONOMISUTO, July 15, 1991, at 95.
253. See, eg., Kinseichd hkoku an: Gy.kai e no hairyo yasen, supra note 244, at 7
(criticizing the Report for excessive concentration on industry interests at the expense of users
and other interests); Interview with Kii Nakamura [Vice President of Housewives' Association]:
Riy6sha mo shinken sh6bu no toki, YOMitIRI SHINBUN, June 15, 1991 at 7 (stating that the
Reports' focus on efficient competition will only benefit rich investors). At least some politicians
apparently view this as an excellent opportunity to score some political points without doing much
else about the problem. The chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) own Financial
Problem Research Council is critical of the report for its failure to deal with consumer needs.
See, e.g., Tetsuo Kondo, Kin'ya seido kaikaku wa dare no tame ni okonawareru no ka,
EKONOMISUTO, July 15, 1991, at 66. The LDP also sought to gain political recognition by
proposing a more user-friendly, European-style banking system after it was already too late to
actually alter the direction of reform. Emiko Terazono, Call for Japan Banking to Adopt
European Style, FIN. TMES, May 20, 1991, at 17.
254. See BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 16. It is perhaps illustrative that the English
translation of the Report states that "[ulsers' benefits to be brought about by this revision of the
financial system are discussed ... in the addendum." Id. This addendum, however, was
apparently so unimportant that it was not included in the translation. Examples of user benefits
promised in this addendum include such basic ideas as improved service and varieties of products
through increased competition and more assertive handling of housing loans by ordinary banks
once they are able to acquire long-term capital. See; eg., id. at 9 (advocating increased competi-
tion as a means to providing better service and more products). There was criticism that such
matters should have been included directly in the body of the Report. See Gink, Shekengaisha
ga kawarw Yokin kakumei-shinsh5hin kaikin de kakine kuzushi, YOMIURI SHINBUN, June 6,
1991, at 1; Kin'ya kaikaku no riten kyachd, YOMIURI SHInUN, May 26, 1991, at 1. It is also
hardly surprising that the criticism that the institutions which have expressed the greatest concern
for the needs of the user are also those which would be most disadvantaged by the reform: the
long-term credit banks and the securities companies. See, e.g., Yoshio Matsumoto, Baransu kaku
fugin no saiken hakk6 gy~mu sannya, EKONOMISUTO, July 15, 1991, at 88 (noting criticism of
both the Banking and Securities Reports by a representative of the long- term banking industry).
With respect to consumer protection, a senior BOJ official commented that excessive concern for
consumer protection would create a counterproductive "moral hazard," particularly if consumers
and institutions knew that they would always be aided by the government "whatever risk they
take." Financial Regulators Split on Benefits of Japanese Financial Restructuring Plan, Banking
Report (BNA) No. 22, at 969 (June 1, 1992). Why this would be different from the current
system-in which institutions, rather than consumers, know that the government will step in to
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concerned with protecting investors, the sincerity of this concern
appears to be questionable.
Similarly, the internationalization of the financial system was
addressed only in very general terms, despite being one of the primary
reasons why reform had become necessary. The Banking Report made
two extremely nebulous recommendations regarding the subject,
namely that "consideration should be given to ensuring smooth entry
of foreign financial institutions .. ."' and that "the process of
liberalization and internationalization needs to be furthered by
reviewing the existing vertically divided system and customs stemming
from it.'"" In addition, one observer noted that the various condi-
tions and stipulations exhorted by both Reports, if implemented, would
only make the system even more opaque to outsiders."7 Certainly,
there was scant praise from foreign observers for the proposed
reforms.25'
Another grievance with the Reports was that they made few
concrete proposals and were often in disagreement when they did. As
one foreign commentator noted, the Reports had "a long way to go
before agreeing on the basics, let alone the details." 9  In addition,
language in some crucial places was deliberately ambiguous, sparking
renewed skirmishes over interpretation.2 °
Finally, observers also acknowledged that the Financial System
Reform Council and the Securities and Exchange Council left most of
the difficult problems for the MOF bureaucrats to solve.21 To some,
prevent failures-is unclear.
255. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 28.
256. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
257. See Ohta, supra note 252, at 95 (criticizing the reform process from the viewpoint of
corporate customers).
258. Neil Weinberg, Ministry of Finance Short on Cataclysms, NIKKEI WKLY., July 6, 1991,
at 16. Still, some financiers, such as trust bankers, are happy about the subdued nature of the
proposed changes because they benefit from limited competition under the current system. Id.
259. MOF Market Reforms a Long Way Off; Flap Over Securities Plan Slows Progress, supra
note 224.
260. For example, though not directly translated in the English version of the Banking
Report, the Japanese original uses "etc." ("nado") at crucial junctures, usually where a proposal
might be too controversial to state specifically. Naoyuki Isono, Vague Phrase Boosts Ministry's
Power, NIKKEI WKLY., June 29, 1991, at 4. In one instance, the Banking Report states that new
entrants to trust banking should initially be excluded from "some aspects of trust of money, etc.,
including pension trusts, loan trusts, etc." BANKING REPORT, supra note 3. This type of vague
wording obviously prevents banks from making any concrete plans, barring further clarification
by the MOF. Ld.
261. See, eg., Gutaisaku wa sakiokuri, YoMIUI SHINtIN, May 25, 1991, at 7 (noting that
solutions to the real problems had simply been deferred by the Reports, and that further
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this outcome may seem unusual, considering that the Reports were
issued by advisory bodies attached to the same ministry. In fact, the
discrepancies between the Reports are symbolic of the frequent
criticism that the MOF is "all bureaus and no ministry."262
V. WHAT, IF ANYTHING, HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED?
A. The Financial System Reform Act of 1992
Nearly a year after the release of the Banking and Securities
Reports, the Japanese cabinet finally agreed upon a proposed financial
reform bill. It was submitted to the Diet on March 17, 19922
and passed into law largely unamended two months later. The
Financial System Reform Act is comprehensive, containing amend-
ments to sixteen existing statutes, including the laws governing most
types of financial institutions, with the notable exception of insurance
companies.' The Financial System Reform Act does not contain
anything that should surprise anyone familiar with the deliberations of
the two reform councils. Nevertheless, it diverges from the Securities
and Banking Reports in several small but significant respects.
Consequently, it is worthwhile to review the main provisions of the
new law that pertain to the banking and securities industries and to
compare them to the recommendations contained in the Banking
Report and Securities Report.
1. Impact on Banking Industry. First, the Financial System
Reform Act expands the definition of a bank's primary activities from
"acceptance of term deposits" (teiki tsumikin no ukeire) to "acceptance
of term deposits, etc." (teiki tsumikin nado no ukeire).2 67 Second, the
accommodation of the two Reports would probably be difficult); Ohta, supra note 252; Kin'ya
kaikaku okura an: Sh5torishin to nao zure mo, YOMIRI SHINBUN, Apr. 26, 1991, at 7
(describing the difficulty of reconciling the Banking and Securities Reports because the parties
involved had conflicting interests).
262. See Kin'yi kaikaku 6kura an: Shetorishin to nao zure mo, supra note 261, at 7.
263. Kenro Kakeya, Banks Lukewarm on Finance Reform Bilk Entry to Securities Industry
Will be Limited, NIKKEI WKLY., Mar. 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Nikkei File.
264. FNANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM BILL, supra note 4.
265. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
266. Hiroshi Naka & Akio Nakamura, Kin'ya seido/shdken torihiki seido kaikaku h6 no
gaiyo, 1293 SHOn HOMu 2,2 (1992).
267. BANKING LAW art. 10(1)(i), Law No. 59 of 1981, amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM
REFORM Acr, Law No. 87 of 1992. The term "nado" is equivalent to "etcetera" in English.
Although there has been virtually no comment on this apparently minor semantic change, it
seems clear that the addition of "nado" to the list of banks' primary activities opens the door to
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Financial System Reform Act amends the Banking Law to permit all
types of banks to participate in the private placement of securities in
the secondary market.' Third, the Financial System Reform Act
adds a provision to the Banking Law granting the MOF the authority
to establish capital-adequacy requirements and other standards for
judging the financial health of banks. 9 Fourth, and most significant-
ly, the Financial System Reform Act enables banks and other
depository institutions to establish securities and trust banking
subsidiaries subject to the condition that they hold at least 50 percent
of the shares of such entitiesY However, a rider to the Act stipu-
a vastly expanded interpretation of what those activities are.
268. Id. art. 10(2)(vi), amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT. Other types of
financial institutions are granted the same permission. See SHINYO KINKO HO [CREDIT
ASSOCIATION LAW] art. 53(3)(vi), Law No. 238 of 1951, amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM
REFORM ACT, WORKERS' BANKING INSTITUTION LAW art. 58(2)(xii), Law No. 227 of 1953,
amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT, CHOSHO KIGYO KYODO KUMIAI HO [LAW FOR
SMALL BUSINESS COOPERATIVES] art. 9-8(2)(xi), Law No. 181 of 1949, amended by FINANCIAL
SYSTEM REFORM ACT, NOGYO KYODO KUMIAI HO [AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE LAW], art.
10(6)(vii), Law No. 139 of 1948, amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT, NORIN CHOO
KINKO HO [NORIN CHOKIN BANK LAW] art. 13(1)(ix-ii), Law No. 42 of 1923, amended by
FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT, SHOKO KUMIAI CHOO KINKO HO [SHOKO CHOKIN BANK
LAw] art. 28(1)(xii), Law No. 14 of 1936, amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT. Long-
term credit banks also benefit from the change by article 17 of the Long-Term Credit Bank Law
which makes the relevant sections of the Banking Law applicable to them. LONG-TERM CREDIT
BANK LAW, art. 17, Law No. 187 of 1952.
269. BANKING LAW art. 14(2), Law No. 58 of 1981, amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM
ACT. The Banking Report recommended that in order to achieve a balance with other countries,
and for administrative transparency, capital adequacy requirements should be specified by statute.
See supra note 217 and accompanying text. It has been suggested by some that it is inappropriate
to require banks only engaged in domestic banking to meet an international standard and that
the flexibility granted by allowing the MOF to set standards was necessary. E.g., Yamashita
Tomonobu, Kin'ya seido ni kansuru horitsu no seibi, SHOJI HOMU, Aug. 15, 1992, 17, 18. This
argument does not explain, however, why the rationales for a statutory capital-adequacy
requirement are no longer operative.
270. BANKING LAW art. 16(2), amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT, FOREIGN
EXCHANGE BANK LAW art. 9(8), Law No. 67 of 1954, amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM
ACT, WORKERS' BANKING INSTITUTION LAW art. 58(3), Law No. 227 of 1953, amended by
FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT, LONG-TERM CREDIT BANK LAW art. 13(2), Law No. 187 of
1952, amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT, CREDIT ASSOCIATION LAW arts. 54(15)-
(16), Law No. 238 of 1951, amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM Acr, LAW CONCERNING
THE FINANCIAL ACIVITIES OF COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATIONS art. 4, Law No. 183 of 1949,
amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACt, AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE LAW art. 11(16),
amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT, NORIN CHOKIN BANK LAW arts. 22(2)-(4), Law
No. 42 of 1923, amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT. Note that in the case of shinkin
banks, labor banks, agricultural and other cooperatives, only federations of these entities rather
than individual institutions are permitted to acquire and own securities or trust subsidiaries. See
sources cited supra. Because trust banks are ordinary banks empowered to engage in trust
activities by a separate statute, authority for the acquisition of subsidiaries by trust banks is
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lates that, for "the time being," licensing of bank securities subsidiaries
will be conditioned on their not engaging in securities brokering.17
The same section of the Act also clarifies the rules governing bank
ownership of foreign-incorporated trust and securities subsidiaries 2m
In addition, the Financial System Reform Act establishes that
certain transactions between parent banks and their subsidiaries will
be restricted or prohibited,, 3 although the creation of specific
firewalls is left largely to administrative discretion 4  The Financial
System Reform Act also allows smaller institutions, which are
generally too small to establish full subsidiaries, to engage in certain
trust and securities-related activities by themselvesO 5  Similarly, the
Financial System Reform Act expands the scope of other activities in
which the smaller banks and depository institutions are permitted to
engage.276 Finally, as a possible indicator of the troubles experienced
throughout the banking industry, the Financial System Reform Act
amends the 1968 Law Concerning Amalgamation and Conversion of
Financial Institutions by making it possible for all types of depository
institutions to merge or convert to a more viable format.' This will
derived from the Financial System Reform Act's amendments to the Banking Law. See supra
note 55 and accompanying text. The Act does not alter the Antimonopoly Law's basic
prohibition on ownership of greater than 5 percent of a company's shares by a financial
institution. Compare ANTIMONOPOLY LAW art. 11, Law No. 54 of 1947 with FINANCIAL SYSTEM
REPORT ACT passim (containing no amendments in this area). This means that not only will
subsidiaries have to be licensed by the MOF, but the parent companies will have to apply to the
FTC for an exemption from the Antimonopoly Law's prohibition. ANTIMONOPOLY LAW art. 11,
Law No. 54 of 1947; see Naka & Nakamura, supra note 266, at 4.
271. FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM BILL, supra note 4, app., art. 19.
272. BANKING LAW art. 16(4), Law No. 58 of 1981, amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM
ACT.
273. Id. art. 16(3), amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT.
274. Okura Sh6 [Ministry of Finance], Kin'yi seido kaikaku jisshi no gaiyO ni tsuite, Dec. 17,
1992, reprinted in KIN'YO ZAISEI JuTO, Jan. 4, 1992, at 107 [hereinafter Reform Outline].
275. E.g., AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE LAW art. 10(7), (8), amended by FINANCIAL
SYSTEM REFORM ACT.
276. Although a detailed discussion of the full extent of changes wrought by the Financial
System Reform Act is beyond the scope of this Note, some examples of activities opened up to
smaller institutions such as shinkins and labor banks include dealings in local government and
certain corporate bonds, safekeeping of valuables, and guaranteeing of debts. See, eg., LABOR
BANK LAW art. 58(2)(vii), Law No. 227 of 1953, amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT
(guarantee of liabilities); CREDrr ASSOCIATION LAW art. 53(8)(i), Law No. 238 of 1951, amended
by FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT (dealing with local government bonds); LAW FOR SMALL
BUSINESS COOPERATIVES art. 9(8)(2)(xiv), Law. No. 181 of 1949, amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM
REFORM ACT (safekeeping deposit of valuables). Note again that the Act repeals the s6go Bank
Law. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
277. LAW CONCERNING AMALGAMATION AND CONVERSION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
arts. 3, 4, Law. No. 86 of 1968, amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT. Under the
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presumably make it easier for the MOF to save troubled institutions
by encouraging them to merge with healthy ones.
2. Impact on Securities Industry. With respect to the securities
industry, the Financial System Reform Act makes substantial changes
which are largely outside the scope of this Note. Briefly, the Financial
System Reform Act permits securities companies to establish trust and
banking subsidiaries,278 gives a more complete definition to the term
"private placement,"' 9 and expands the definition of "security,"
although without providing a thorough American-style statutory
definition as recommended by the Securities Report.' The Finan-
cial System Reform Act also establishes new and more stringent
disclosure rules and generally establishes a more well-defined legal
structure for securities transactions." ' Under its amendments to the
Securities Transaction Law, the Financial System Reform Act permits
banks to act as intermediaries for some of the instruments that the Act
newly designates as securities.'
preamendment version of the merger law, a number of types of institutions, such as labor banks
and long-term credit banks, were precluded from merging with other types of institutions. LAW
CONCERNING AMALGAMATION AND CONVERSION OF FINANCIAL INSITUTIONS arts. 3, 4, Law
No. 86 of 1968 (amended 1992).
278. SECURITIES TRANSACTION LAW art. 43(2), Law No. 25 of 1948, amended by FINANCIAL
SYSTEM REFORM Acr.
279. Id. art. 2(8)(vi). The amendments clarify that private placements are "securities
activities" for legal purposes, but that banks may, with the MOFs permission, participate in
private placements. Id.
280. SECURITIES TRANSACrION LAW art. 2(1), (2), Law No. 25 of 1948, amended by
FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM Acr, SECURrrms REPORT, supra note 3, at 155-57. In fact, apart
from a few specific instruments such as commercial paper, the definition of security is expanded
only to the extent that the Act lists a number of instruments that may be designated as securities
by administrative order some time in the future. FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT, amending
SECURITIES TRANSACTION LAW art. 2(1), (2). An example of such a provision is as follows:
"[t]he term 'securities' in this law shall mean those as mentioned in the following: ... (viii) Those
promissory notes issued by a judicial person in order to procure necessary funds for its business
as may be designated [as securities] by Ministry of Finance Order." FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM
ACT, amending SECURITIES TRANSACTION LAw art. 2(1)(viii) (author's translation)(emphasis
designates amendment). Some industry insiders have voiced dissatisfaction over the legislation's
disregard for the recommendations of the Securities Council in this regard. Tokumei Zadanka"
Tdsho no kaikaku no rinen to kairi shite inai ka?, KIN'YO ZAISEI JuO, Apr. 20, 1992, at 18
[hereinafter Round Table Discussion 4].
281. SECURITIESTRANSACTIONLAW arts. 3-66(3), amended by FINANCIALSYSTEM REFORM
ACT.
282. Id. art. 65, 65(2), amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT.
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B. New Factors Affecting Reform
Three important factors must be kept in mind when looking at the
Financial System Reform Act as the end product of the reform
process: (1) the manner in which the Financial System Reform Act is
to be implemented; (2) the effects of changing economic conditions
within the financial industry; and (3) the role of recent financial
scandals in shaping the reform process.
1. Implementation: The MOF Tightens its Grip. Financial
"reform" has not been in any way synonymous with "deregulation" or
"liberalization" as some originally thought.' Amended Articles
16-2 and 16-3 of the Banking Law make this perfectly clear.
These articles leave a great deal of discretion to the MOF, either
directly through the grant of rulemaking authority or indirectly
through the MOF's ability to interpret the etceteras and ambiguous
language. These two provisions also set the tone for the entire
Financial System Reform Act. For every new sphere of activity the
Financial System Reform Act makes available to the different types of
financial institutions, the more the MOF is granted the gatekeeping
power to regulate entry into the sphere and the authority to fine tune
activities within this sphere. In effect, the Financial System
283. See Sender, supra note 161, at 131 ("To MOF officials the very term deregulation sounds
... too messy... ; they prefer 'rationalization' or 'consolidation' or even 'reregulation."').
284. The text of the law reads as follows:
ARTICLE 16-2 (OWNERSHIP OF STOCK IN SECURITIES COMPANIES, ETC.)
A bank may, with the permission of the Minister of Finance, acquire and own a number
of stocks (limited to those with voting rights) greater than 50 percent of the total
number of outstanding shares in a securities company, trust bank, or other bank (limited
to those designated by Ministry of Finance ordinances) ....
ARTICLE 16-3 (TRANSACTION, ETC., WITH SUBSIDIARIES) A Bank may not
engage in the following conduct with its subsidiaries, eta... or customers (provided this
may not be applicable in situations where the performance of the transaction in question
is necessary for the public interest and permission has been received from the Minister
of Finance):
1) Transactions with the subsidiary, etc., where its conditions are determined to
be disadvantageous to the [parent] bank when compared to the bank's normal
conditions for such a transaction.
2) [T]ransactions or activities [between a parent bank and its subsidiary or the
subsidiary's customer] that are designated by Ministry of Finance Ordinances
as potentially hindering the [parent] bank's sound and proper operations.
SECURITIES TRANSACTION LAW arts. 16(2), (3), amended by FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT
(author's translation) (emphases highlight discretionary elements left to the MOF).
285. As mentioned previously, the amendments to the definitional article of the Securities
and Exchange Law leave the process of defining new types of securities almost entirely to MOF
or Cabinet ordinances. See supra note 280 and accompanying text. The Act also adds a new
requirement for a bank to obtain authorization from the MOF when it tries to establish a
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Reform Act greatly expands the authority of the MOF to regulate
financial institutions. This is an interesting result considering that the
liberalization of finance was a primary motivation for the reform
process. 6
On December 17, 1992, the MOF filled many of the gaps left in
the Financial System Reform Act when it issued its blueprint for
reform, titled "Concerning the Outline for the Implementation of
Financial System Reform" (Outline).' Projecting that implementa-
tion of the Financial System Reform Act will commence in April 1993,
the Outline summarizes some of the regulations that the MOF
intended to establish in order to ,implement the Financial System
Reform Act.' First, securities subsidiaries of banks will not be
permitted to engage in the issue, distribution, or brokering of most
forms of equity securities. 9 Similarly, trust bank subsidiaries will be
securities or trust subsidiary abroad; this requirement is likely to strengthen the MOFs
supervision over overseas activities of banks. See Kazumi Akiyama & Akio Nakamura, Kin'ya
seido oyobi shaken torihiki seido no kaikaku no tame no kankei h~ritsu no seibi nado ni kansuru
haritsu ni tsuite, JURIsUTO, Sept. 1, 1992, 129, at 131.
286. See Round Table Discussion 4, supra note 280, at 19.
287. Reform Outline, supra note 274, at 107. Immediately before publication of this Note,
a number of MOF and cabinet ordinances implementing the details of the Financial System
Reform Act were issued. Due to the timing, quantity, and scope of these ordinances a detailed
analysis of their content is impossible. A preliminary examination, however, indicates that they
are largely consistent with the proposals contained in the Reform Outline: minimum
capitalization of securities companies was raised to Y10 billion; minimum capitalization
requirements of most other types of financial institutions were doubled or significantly raised;
detailed rules pertaining to firewalls, securities transactions, etc., were also established. See
generally KANPO, Mar. 3, 1993 (Special Edition), at 1-127.
288. Id.
289. Id. Specifically, securities subsidiaries of banks will not be permitted to deal or broker
convertible bonds, warrant bonds, and warrant securities. Id. They are prohibited from all
dealings, including underwriting, in stocks, stock index futures, and stock index options. Id. This
effectively limits banks' securities subsidiaries to dealing in bonds, investment securities, and
primary market transactions involving convertible bonds and warrants. Id. A question that
remains unanswered is what will happen if, instead of establishing a securities subisidiary, a bank
acquires a majority interest in an existing brokerage house. The MOF has indicated that, with
very limited exceptions, the FTC would deem such a transaction anticompetitive and refuse to
grant an Antimonopoly Law Article 11 exemption. See Naka & Nakamura, supra note 266, at
4. This approach avoids a specific answer to the difficult question of whether a securities house
acquired by a bank in this manner would be allowed to continue its brokerage activities. The
MOF has held out the possiblity of participating in the full range of securities activites through
an acquired subsidiary as a carrot to enlist the aid of banks in bailing out Japan's many troubled
smaller securities firms. See Bankers' Embrace, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1992, at 88. But see David
Sneider, Financial Services Reform in Japan, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Feb. 9,1993, at 6 ("MOF has
made it clear that acquisitions [of existing securities firms] will not be approved except in a
'rescue' context."). Because the Act only requires a majority interest, another question that
remains is whether the MOF will permit banks to establish jointly-owned subsidiaries, with a
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restricted in the scope of trust activities in which they may engage.29
The MOF will, however, in two or three years, reconsider the scope of
activities in which subsidiaries are permitted to engage.291
The Outline also establishes a large number of firewalls. These
include restrictions on personnel exchanges between parent and
subsidiary, dealings with common clients, transactions between parent
and subsidiary, and the shared use of facilities.29
As for the timing of mutual entry, the Outline will allow long-term
credit banks, trust banks, and central cooperatives, such as the Ndrin
chakin Bank, to establish securities subsidiaries first.2  Securities
companies, long-term credit banks, the Bank of Tokyo, and the
national federations of specialized financial institutions will have
priority in establishing trust subsidiaries.294 One year after these
institutions have established subsidiaries, the MOF will consider
allowing other banks (i.e., city banks) to set up their own subsidiar-
ies.295 Finally, the Outline eliminates the "three bureaus guidance"
controls on foreign bond issues and raises the minimum capitalization
requirements for banks and securities companies to ¥20 billion and
V100 billion respectively.296
Although the Outline substantially clarifies the content of the
Financial System Reform Act, it nevertheless leaves several details
undefined, particularly concerning the question of firewalls.29 Thus,
minority interest held by another bank or company. See Round Table Discussion 4, supra note
280, at 21.
290. Reform Outline, supra note 274, at 108. Perhaps the only bright spot in the whole
Outline was the MOF's indication that it intends to allow regional financial institutions to engage
in land trust, public benefit trust, special gift, and movable properties trust activities without
establishing trust subsidiaries. See id. at 109.
291. See id, at 107.
292. Id at 107-08; see also Sneider, supra note 289, at 6 (summarizing firewalls to be
established).
293. Reform Outline, supra note 274, at 109.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. For example, in its discussion of firewalls, the Outline states that:
Restrictions on Sharing of Business Premises, etc.: Regulations, such as
disallowing the establishment of the head office of a securities subsidiary in the same
building as the head office of the parent financial institution, will be imposed. In
addition, regulations on the establishment of branches or business offices of a securities
subsidiary sharing the same building as the offices, etc., of the parent financial institution
and regulations on the joint use of computer facilities, dealing rooms, etc., will be
imposed.
Id, at 108 (author's translation). Obviously it would be difficult to consider establishing a
subsidiary without greater elaboration of these firewalls.
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the Outline itself will have to be further clarified before anyone can
begin to consider establishing a subsidiary.
2. More Bad Times. Tunes have changed since Japan's financial
industries first began developing new products and expanding into new
fields of activity. Many of the economic factors that originally
stimulated reform are no longer operative. The bursting of the bubble
economy and consequent plummeting of share and land prices have
had serious consequences throughout the Japanese economy.298 The
financial industry has been hit particularly hard by "Japan's monetary
implosion."2 9
The magnitude of banks' bad debt problems came to light at the
peak of the reform process. Many banks are saddled with a huge
portfolio of nonperforming loans, collateralized primarily with
illiquid real estate whose value has sunk drastically."° The drop in
298. See, eg., Corporate Japan Attempts Another Rebirth, ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 1992, at 75.
("[F]or the third time since the second world war, Japanese business is facing massive and painful
readjustment."); Japanese Banks: From Bad to Worse, ECONOMIST, Nov. 7, 1992, at 99
("Japanese firms now face their third year of declining profits.... Businesses with net debts
totalling 5.2 trillion yen went bust in the first nine months of 1992.").
299. Japan's Monetary Implosion, ECONOMIST, Oct. 31, 1992, at 75; see also Steven Butler,
Gloomy Report from Bank of Japan, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 26,1992, at 10; Butler, supra note 164, at
12.
300. Estimates of the extent of these loans vary greatly. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 29, at
16 (citing MOF estimates that Japan's top twenty-one banks hold 'r7-8 trillion in loans); Japan's
Monetary Implosion, supra note 299, at 75 (estimating bad loans held by banks at up to V60
trillion yen).
301. See Martin, supra note 29, at 16. See generally Bad-Debt Troubles, ECONOMIST, Sept.
14, 1991, at 97, 98 (explaining that banks used non-banks to bypass official restrictions on loans
to property companies); Deep in Bad Debt, ECONOMIST, Nov. 2,1991, at 70,72 (noting problems
arising from property lending). When property prices were booming in the 1980s, in order to
circumvent restrictions on bank lending to real estate companies, banks lent money to nonbank
affiliates which in turn lent heavily to real estate speculators. Once land prices fell, the banks
were left holding the bag. See Japan's Non-banks: What a Mess, ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 1991, at
96, 98; Martin, supra note 29, at 16. The bad debt problem has reached such a magnitude that
in January 1993, under government auspices, the banking industry established the Cooperative
Credit Purchasing Company (CCPC). See Robert Thomson, Restoring Faith in a Banking
System-Japan's CCPC will Tackle the Industry's Problems, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 28, 1993, at 20.
Similar in function to the United States Resolution Trust Corporation, the CCPC will buy up
property used as collateral for bad loans. See Much Ado About Nothing, ECONOMIST, Nov. 7,
1992, at 99. While it was originally envisioned that the government would help fund this
corporation, it ultimately did not, thus rendering the whole operation little more than an
accounting artifice. See id. The nonbanks and MITI are reportedly discussing the establishment
of a similar institution to buy up the bad loans of nonbanks. Agency Proposed to Protect
Investors in Leases and Credits, Comline Daily News-Tokyo Financial Wire, Dec. 11, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, COMLIN File.
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share prices has similarly had direct, negative effects on banks."°
Furthermore, the overall economic climate has seriously affected the
ability of banks to make a profit. Troubled companies are drawing
down their deposits, 3 and stagnant loan growth means that it will
be difficult for banks to increase lending, which has been their
traditional technique for offsetting bad debts.3" Securities companies
have similarly been battered by the collapse of stock prices, and all but
the largest are currently operating at a loss.3 5
As a result of these economic woes, banks and other financial
companies are going bankrupt,3" restructuring,307 cutting person-
nel,3" and reducing the scope of their overseas activities.3" Given
the present economic climate and the substantial barriers to, and
limitations on, the establishment of subsidiaries, few financial
institutions have any interest in taking such action.310 Most are
302. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. Apart from the obvious economic loss
caused by the drop in share prices, and because banks are allowed to count up to 45 percent of
unrealized capital gains (hidden assets) towards meeting the new international capital adequacy
requirements, any drop in the stock market hinders a bank's ability to fulfill these requirements.
See Japan's Banks Count Their Capital, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1992, at 82; Japanese Shares: Not
What They Used to Be, ECONOMIST, Jan. 25, 1992, at 79, 80.
303. Japan's Monetary Implosion, supra note 299, at 75.
304. Bad-Debt Troubles, supra note 301, at 98. See generally Lending by Japan's Banks
Grows 2.0% in Jam, Japan Econ. Newswire, Feb. 9,1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, JEN
File (loan growth continued to be slow and the limited growth that did occur was attributable to
relief loans to troubled companies rather than loans for capital investment). The requirement
that banks meet the BIS 8 percent capital-adequacy requirements that are scheduled to come into
force in March 1993 have also restrained banks' ability to expand lending. See BIS Rule Restained
Bank Lending in FY'91, Sources Say, Japan Econ. Newswire, June 4, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, JEN file; Japan's Banks Count Their Capital, supra note 302, at 82.
305. Japanese Shares: Not What They Used to Be, supra note 302, at 80; see also Bankers'
Embrace, supra note 289, at 88.
306. In 1991 Japan's Deposit Insurance Corporation was, for the first time since its inception
in 1971, called on to bail out a troubled bank by financing its merger with another bank. See
Japanese Banks: More Pain, ECONOMIST, May 9, 1992, at 105. A second bailout took place in
spring of 1992. Id. Because the MOF has previously been able to "encourage" banks to assist
troubled comrades without relying on the Deposit Insurance Corporation, these events indicate
a breakdown of the traditional informal safety net. See, eg., Sender, supra note 161, at 135.
307. See, e-g., Emiko Terazono, Leading Japanese Bank to Restructure, FIN. TMAES, Sept. 4,
1992, at 21. Some of the smaller securities companies are reported to be considering mergers in
order to survive. Bankers' Embrace, supra note 289, at 88.
308. See, e.g., Dismal Performance Driving Japanese Banks to Streamline, Japan Econ.
Newswire, Aug. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, JEN File.
309. See, eg., Richard Waters, Japanese Banks Step up Pace of International Withdrawal, FIN.
TIMEs, Nov. 13, 1992, at 23 (reporting that Japanese banks reduced their overall international
banking assets by U.S. $53 billion in the second quarter of 1992).
310. See Japanese Savings: Safe as Post Offices, ECONOMIST, Dec. 26,1992, at 100. ("Banks
... are no longer in a hurry to enter the securities business, which is conspicuously unprofitable
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concerned with mere survival. In fact, insiders from each financial
sector have indicated that they would prefer to see the reform process
frozen for the next one or two years.31
1
3. Scandals. Recent financial scandals have been an important
factor in the process of financial reform. During the summer of 1991,
when the Financial System Reform Council issued its Banking Report,
a number of scandals within the financial industry came to light.
Scandals involving large securities houses were perhaps the most
egregious. Nomura Securities was eventually punished for financing
the securities transactions of organized crime leaders, compensating
favored clients for losses, and manipulating the market.312  Several
prominent banks were also involved in a highly publicized scandal in
which bank employees issued forged certificates of deposit to a
restaurant owner who used them as collateral to borrow ¥240 billion
worth of loans, which she spent on stock speculation before going
bankrupt.313  These highly publicized scandals called into doubt the
ability of the MOF to control the financial industries through informal
these days."). In an anonymous symposium published shortly before the Outline was issued,
industry insiders discussed the prospects of establishing subsidiaries. Zadanka" Kin'ya seido
kaikaku no ketchaku to wa nani ka?, KiN'YO ZAISEI JuO, Dec. 7,1992, at 22 [hereinafter Round
Table Discussion 5]. The representative of the trust banking industry stated unequivocally that
there was virtually no merit in establishing a securities subsidiary. Id. at 24. The securities
industry representative voiced similar sentiments, noting that the costs of establishing trust
banking subsidiaries would be prohibitive even for the largest securities houses, which are
currently making drastic cuts in costs and personnel. Id. at 25. Less delicately, the same
representative suggested that any businessman who expanded into the trust business given the
current climate was an idiot. Id. Even the representative of the city banks, which are generally
regarded to be the winners in the reform process, indicated that the current economic climate was
at its worst for entry into new business, and the substantial cost of establishing a subsidiary would
be money better spent in other endeavors. Id. at 23, 26; see also Give Us Deregulation-But Not
Yet, EUROMONEY, Dec. 1992, at 66. Paradoxically, now that the MOF has decided to allow two
of the troubled long-term credit banks to establish securities subsidiaries, there has been some
discussion that the MOF may actually force several of the large securities houses to establish trust
subsidiaries, ostensibly to balance the mutual entry. Kin'ya seido kaiku: Nitsumaru rigai hOsei,
KIN'YO ZAISE JuO, Dec. 7,1992, at 16; Round Table Discussion 5, supra, at 26; see also Toshio
Shinmura & Naoyuki Isono, Institutions Face New Game as Financial Reforms Pass: Phased
Liberalization Expected to Take Years to Complete, NIKKEI WKLY., June 27,1992, at I (reporting
on financial system reform plan that will allow financial services to form various subsidiaries).
311. Round Table Discussion 5, supra note 310, at 27.
312. See Unmasking Honourable IBJ, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1991, at 79; see also Under the
Volcano, ECONOMIST, Sept 7, 1991, at 75.
313. Unmasking Honourable IBJ, supra note 312, at 79. Although the securities scandals
garnered greater publicity, the banking scandals were much larger than the securities scandals in
monetary terms. Anthony Rowley, Ministry of Myopia, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 12, 1991, at
48.
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administrative guidance.1 4 The scandals also brought the FTC, until
recently dubbed "the watchdog that never bites," into the field of
administrative financial regulation, and thus into the MOF's territo-
ry.315 The scandals highlighted the lack of transparency in the
MOF's administration of financial markets. As stated by David
Mulford, United States Treasury Undersecretary for International
Affairs, the difference between recent financial scandals in Japan and
the United States is that rules were clearly broken in the United
States, whereas there were no clear rules in Japan.316  Finally, the
scandals hurt the securities companies economically, especially through
the loss of customers who had begun to doubt the integrity of the
stock market.317
C. Analysis
It is still too early to pass final judgment on the Financial System
Reform Act. At the time of this writing, implementation of the
Financial System Reform Act has just begun. Many issues remain to
be worked out, and in the coming months, new and unforeseen
developments will undoubtedly arise. In addition, financial reform will
not be complete until other sectors of the financial system are
addressed. Although the Financial System Reform Act will have a
significant impact on the trust banks, it does not significantly alter the
pre-World War II Trust Business Law and Trust Law which need to
be updated to reflect a host of new trust-related products.318 The
insurance industry is also suffering from its own economic problems
that need to be addressed,319 as do those of the nonbanks.32 Re-
314. A Ministry Diminished, ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 1992, at 86; see also Kenji Nagano, Push
Seen for New Rules of Integrity, NIKKEI WKLY., July 6, 1991, at 4 (reporting severe public
disapproval of four large securities companies which were involved in scandals).
315. A Ministry Diminished, supra note 314, at 86; see Hayato Yokota, Bankers Pressed to
Heighten Competition, NIKKEX WKLY., Nov. 30,1991, at 15. With regard to the securities scandal,
the FTC forced the four largest firms to sign consent decrees agreeing not to pay secret
compensation or guarantee returns on pain of criminal sanctions. A Ministry Diminished, supra
note 314, at 86.
316. Satoshi Isaka, U.S. to Japan: Speed Financial Reforms, NiKKEI WKLY., Oct. 26, 1991,
at 4. The same official also stated that "[t]he scandals, in a more general way, reflect the very
problems we have concentrated on for eight years." Id.
317. See Robert Thomson, A Besieged Industry Draws up Plans for Survival, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1992, at 21.
318. See Yashihiro Kataoka, Kin'ya seido kaikaku han to sono haikei, KiN'YO ZAISEX JuO,
Apr. 5, 1992, at 4, 6.
319. See Withdrawal Symptoms, ECONOMIST, Dec. 19,1992, at 75. In October 1992, a council
of insurance industry representatives issued an interim report endorsing major reform of their
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form of the postal savings network will also be crucial if the Financial
System Reform Act is to have any meaningful impact. 2  True
change, therefore, is projected to take several years. Nevertheless, this
examination of the progress of financial reform to date merits some
comments, albeit from an outsider's point of view.
Compared to England's "Big Bang" financial reform3  of
several years ago, the Financial System Reform Act is a dull thud at
best. Yet, given the recent turn of events this is hardly surprising.
The almost exclusive delegation of authority to the MOF to implement
the Financial System Reform Act and to define its terms reflects the
concerns of the Act's drafters, the MOF officials."z Accordingly, it
is possible to interpret the final shape of the Financial System Reform
Act in two different ways. The more charitable interpretation is that
MOF officials, faced with a financial crisis of historic magnitude, felt
that the only way to reform the financial system without causing an
economic calamity was to retain firm control over the speed and
industry. Japanese Insurance: Change in the Air, ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 1992, at 85. A major new
insurance law is expected to be enacted in 1995. Id.
320. See Japan's Non-banks: What a Mess, supra note 301, at 96. A MOF advisory panel was
set up in October 1991 to discuss reform in the nonbank industry, and numerous new rules
regulating nonbanks were passed contemporaneously with the Financial System Reform Act.
Japan Still Shies From Embracing ABS, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES LErER, July 6,1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, IDD File; Yoko Kobayashi, Japan Panel Proposes Tighter
Rules for Non-banks, Reuters, June 15,1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File; Neil
Weinberg, Nonbank Institutions in Japan to be Supervised Although the Heavy Damage is Already
Done, 2 THOMSON'S INT'L BANKING REGULATOR, July 6, 1992, at 3, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, INTREG File. It was also reported that the MOF was planning to establish a section
within its Banking Bureau to monitor nonbanks. Japan MOF to Set up Section to Monitor Non-
banks, Reuters, June 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
321. Because of its status as a government controlled institution, the postal saving network
is able to offer interest rates and terms to individual depositors with which banks cannot compete.
See Japanese Monetary Growth. Slow, However You Slice It, ECONOMIST, Oct. 19, 1991, at 96.
In addition to their competitive advantage postal accounts are reliable. Thus, as a result of the
financial scandals and rising concern about the health of many financial institutions, money has
been flowing into postal coffers at a phenomenal rate: ¥10 trillion during the period of June 1991
to April 1992. See A Better Deal for Customers?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 4, 1992, at 100. The
existence of the postal savings network distorts the financial marketplace by rewarding risk-
adverse behavior. See generally Japanese Savings: Safe as Post Offices, supra note 310, at 100
(noting the advantages of deposits in the postal savings system over private banks).
322. In October 1986, the British government carried out a sweeping reform, the "Big Bang"
of the British financial system, including the complete removal of the wall between banking and
securities activities. DEREK F. CHANNON, GLOBAL BANKING STRATEGY 238-40 (1988).
323. In Japan, "most legislation is drafted and sponsored by the concerned ministries...
2 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN § 3.02[2][c] (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1992). The Prime Minister of
Japan is empowered to represent the cabinet and thus the Ministries in submitting bills to the
Diet. KENPO [Constitution] arL 72 (Japan).
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direction of change. Under this view, the MOF's concern for the
continued health of existing financial institutions and the economy in
general has resulted in the MOF's slow and cautious implementation
of the Financial System Reform Act.
A less generous interpretation of the Financial System Reform
Act is that deregulation of some aspects of the financial system such
as interest rates, the globalization of Japanese financial markets, the
spontaneous expansion of the activities of Japanese banks at home and
abroad, and the damage caused to the MOF's prestige by the scandals
of 1991, together constitute a serious threat to the MOF's dominance
in the field of financial regulation. The Financial System Reform Act
may be seen as a brilliant maneuver by the MOF to regain control. By
granting privileges to engage in new areas of business to each type of
financial institution with one hand and tightening its grip on the whole
system with the other the MOF is subjecting these privileges to its own
administration. Similarly, the MOF had to ensure that its constituents,
the financial institutions, remained stable throughout the reform in
order to prevent a challenge to its authority to administer them.
Both of these interpretations are probably correct to a certain
extent. Financial reform, however, was not supposed to be about
protecting the authority of the MOF. Furthermore, when the Financial
System Reform Act is viewed together with the Banking and Securities
Reports, several problems become apparent. First, many of the
buzzwords repeatedly used by the reformers---"financial liberalization,"
"internationalization," and "user convenience"-were nothing more
than that, buzzwords.324 As noted previously, given the amount of
control the MOF will have over the reform process, "liberalization" is
not the best description of the Financial System Reform Act.3'
Similarly, nothing about the Financial System Reform Act makes it
readily apparent that its drafters were concerned with the increasingly
international nature of Japan's financial markets. The only significant
proposal in the Banking Report that had a specific international
orientation, the statutory imposition of the BIS capital-adequacy
standards,' 26 was ignored.
324. See Kinseihe hakoku an: Gyakai e no hairyo yasen, supra note 244, at 7. Participants
in the discussion wished that the legislators had kept the original objectives of reform in mind
during the process of enactment. See Round Table Discussion 4, supra note 280, at 21.
325. See supra notes 283-86 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, "user convenience" must have a hollow ring to many
in Japanese financial circles.3' After all, under the Financial System
Reform Act, consumers may soon hypothetically walk into the local
branch of the Industrial Bank of Japan Securities Co. to purchase one
hundred shares of NEC, only to be told politely that as a long-term
credit bank securities subsidiary, it is not currently permitted to engage
in brokering.3"s In the business context, it also remains to be seen
whether companies will actually be interested in doing business with
a securities company that can underwrite bonds but not securities, can
participate in private placements but not actually sell stocks, and so
on.329 If not, it is difficult to see how subsidiaries can develop a
customer base while they wait to be allowed to expand into other
spheres of activity.
The only consistent desire on the part of the reformers appears to
have been that reform be gradual and that no institutions be sacrificed
in the process.33" A comparison of the Banking Report; the Finan-
cial System Reform Act, and the Outline best illustrates this aspiration.
As noted above, the Banking Report discusses internationalization,
financial liberalization, securitization, and user needs at great length.
However, it only makes a few proposals of secondary importance. The
Statement of Reasons at the end of the Financial System Reform Bill
also explains the need to expand the activities of financial institutions
and reform the securities laws to protect investors and depositors by
ensuring the sound management of financial institutions, encouraging
efficient competition, and establishing a financial system that can
interact with those of other countries.33' In contrast, the Outline
makes little mention of protecting either investors or foreign markets.
It does, however, frequently refer to "the soundness of securities
companies, ' 332 "the healthy development of capital markets, 33
and "disciplined entry" into new spheres of business.3'
This is not to suggest that the stability of institutions is not a
legitimate concern or that the MOF has completely ignored other
327. See generally Kuky3 no shaken makikaeshi kenmei, ASAHI SHINBUN, Dec. 13, 1992, at
3 (citing fears that true reform leading to financial liberalization from the point of view of user
convenience will be effectively stymied by the turf battles of the banks and securities companies).
328. See FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM ACT, supra note 5, app., art. 19.
329. See supra notes 209-10, 268, 271, 289 and accompanying text.
330. See generally supra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
331. See FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM BILL, supra note 4, at 68.
332. Reform Outline, supra note 274, at 107.
333. Id
334. Id at 109.
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aspects of reform. From across the Pacific, it is easy to suggest that
troubled institutions should be allowed to fail. Yet, as noted by one
observer, "Japan lacks the safety net of a sturdy deposit insurance
system .... To allow banks to fail in this environment would be to risk
panic."3" A wave of bank failures in 1927 and the resulting econom-
ic and political chaos were factors in both the pre-World War II rise
of the militarists and the concentration of financial resources under the
control of a few large banks which came to serve their cause.336
Nevertheless, by focusing on protecting financial institutions, the
MOF may have inadvertantly destroyed the spirit of financial reform.
As we have seen, the cost and inconvenience to financial users of
raising capital at home was one factor in the flight of Japanese money
overseas. It is debatable whether the MOF has done much to alleviate
this situation. Similarly, Japan's financial system has become a very
important part of the world economy. Accordingly, just as the current
economic problems of Japan's banks are having an impact worldwide,
failure to adequately address the international aspects of financial
reform is also likely to have global repercussions.337
Additionally, insofar as reform was inevitable, the securities
industry may have lost the battle but appears to have won the war.
From the terms of the Financial System Reform Act, the securities
companies would appear to have been the biggest losers. One of the
securities industry's most important proposals, a unified definition of
security, was not included in the Financial System Reform Act. In
addition, the securities scandals, coming at the peak of reform
activities, forced the MOF to shift the focus of reform more onto
cleaning up the securities industry.3 38
335. Rosenbluth, supra note 43, at 100.
336. See id. at 81-82; SHIGEKI TOHYAMA ET AL., SHOWASH! 34-38 (1987).
337. See Charles Leadbeater & Robert Thomson, At a Loss for a Speedy Solution, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 27,1992, at 18 ("fI]nternational consequences could also be profound because of the
pivotal role that Japanese banks now play in the world economy."). See generally Weak
International Bank Performance Largely Due to Events in Japan, BIS Says, 59 Banking Rep.
(BNA) No. 18, at 709 (Nov. 16, 1992) (noting impact of the retrenchment of Japanese banks in
the international market).
338. One securities industry insider has noted that due to the scandals, both the MOF and
the industry have shunned the close communication which previously existed between them,
resulting in disadvantageous treatment of the industry in the final stages of drafting the Act. See
Sh6ichir6 Shimamura, Kannenron ni ikkoku no shrai wo yudaneteyoi no ka, KIN'YO ZAISEi JIUO,
Dec. 7, 1992, at 32; Kuky6 no shken makikaeshi kenmei, supra note 327; see also Round Table
Discussion 4, supra note 280, at 18 (noting that the timing of the scandals was "unfortunate").
Further evidence of the security industry's downfall is found in news that shortly after the Act
was passed, the MOF announced a radical reorganization of its Securities Bureau, with many high
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Yet by virtue of its very weakness, the securities industry appears
to have won the war at the implementation stage. As described above,
the MOF has structured the details of the Financial System Reform
Act so as to protect the battered securities companies as much as
possible. 39 The activities of bank securities subsidiaries are to be
severely restricted for the foreseeable future, and strict firewall
requirements' and extremely high minimum capitalization require-
mentse 1 ensure that entry into the securities business will be an
unattractive prospect for most. Trust subsidiaries have been similarly
hobbled. The city banks, the only banks that still have the capability
and motivation to establish subsidiaries, are being prevented from
doing so for the time being. 2 This is being done precisely because
the city banks presented the most serious competitive threat to existing
securities companies.4
VI. CONCLUSION
Reform has thus become a tool for protecting sectors of the
industry in distress. Some banking industry analysts have adjudged the
Financial System Reform Act as merely being "aimed at rescuing
troubled banks and brokerages by encouraging them to merge. ' 4
This itself is clearly a worthwhile goal and is a continuation of a trend
that was being encouraged by the MOF before passage of the Act. 45
ranking officials being replaced by personnel from other bureaus. Japan Ministry of Finance is
Drafting Ordinances to Implement Financial Reform, 59 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 37, 38
(July 6,1992). In contrast, many Banking Bureau personnel will be promoted within the Bureau,
a sure sign of a job well done. Id. at 38. The scandals also resulted in the creation of the
Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission in July 1992, which is charged with auditing
institutions involved in securities activities. See Japan Said to Increase Probes of Banks and
Securities Houses, 59 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 16 at 648 (Nov. 2, 1992).
339. See supra notes 330-34 and accompanying text; Robert Thomson, Japan to Slow Pace
of Financial Reforms, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1992, at 16; Togin, issei ni fuman no koe, NIHON
KEIzAi SHNBUN, Dec. 18, 1992, at 7; Japan Ministry of Finance is Drafting Ordinances to
Implement Financial Reform, supra note 338, at 38.
340. The so-called "no-return rule," which is likely to be contained in an upcoming ordinance
of the MOF, will prohibit directors who are sent to a subsidiary from ever returning to the parent
bank. Torishimari-yaku no oya-ginkifukki kinshi, NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, Nov. 30,1992, at 5.
341. The minimum capitalization requirement for securities subsidiaries is to be V10 billion,
five times the capital required of trust bank subsidiaries. Reform Outline, supra note 274, at 109.
342. Togin, issei ni fuman no koe, supra note 339.
343. Id.
344. Japan's Diet Passes Bills to Reform Financial System, 58 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 26,
at 1151 (June 29, 1992).
345. See, eg., Takashi Akahashi, Batoru roiyaru ni hi wo tsuketa ky6sai gappei,
ECONOMISUTO, July 15, 1991, at 28, 30 (discussing mergers of regional banks and the possible
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Looking back at the Banking and Securities Reports, however,
one is reminded that financial reform was supposed to do more. By
using the Financial System Reform Act almost exclusively as a means
of accomplishing immediate, utilitarian goals, the MOF has rendered
the reform process legally incoherent. Instead of lowering walls
between different segments, the MOF has created whole new
categories, albeit temporary, of mutant trust banks and emasculated
securities companies, each subject to their own new rules. Rather than
making the financial system more transparent by clarifying the
regulatory structure, the Financial System Reform Act has rendered it
opaque with its vague provisions that delegate substantive imple-
mentation to the MOF And while banks that do want to expand into
other fields of business are rebuffed, securities companies that have no
desire to establish subsidiaries are faced with the prospect of being
forced to do so.'
In effect, the subsidiary approach as implemented by the MOF has
essentially become the piecemeal approach that was rejected by the
Banking Report because it "would make it difficult to pursue a
consistent and far-reaching mutual entry and would not make it
possible to build an internationally acceptable system that extensively
promotes users' benefits." 47  Recall that these are precisely the
criticisms currently being leveled at the Financial System Reform Act
and its implementation by the MOF
Even if several years down the road, with the wave of mergers
completed and the financial industry stabilized, subsidiaries are
eventually permitted to engage in the full range of activities, it seems
unlikely that the subsidiary approach will ever be more than a
transitional device. Leaving politics and the self-interests of the parties
aside, the ultimate goal of the reform, after all, is to allow banks and
securities companies to participate in each other's markets. With this
simple truth in mind it is difficult to rationalize, in jurisprudential
terms, why a bank that is forbidden from engaging in certain activities
can overcome this prohibition merely by establishing a wholly owned
subsdiary. Furthermore, logic suggests that if the raison d'tre
behind the adoption of the subsidiary approach was, as the evidence
emergence of "super" regional banks as a result); Tornio Shiba, Financial Industry Inches Near
Deregulation, JAPAN ECON. J., Feb. 23, 1991, at 35 (table of expected financial liberalization in
1991 indicates the planned merger of over one hundred agricultural cooperatives).
346. Supra note 310 and accompanying text.
347. BANKING REPORT, supra note 3, at 20.
348. See Shimamura, supra note 338, at 33.
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suggests, protection of existing institutions from the harmful side
effects of mutual entry, then once mutual entry has been successfully
achieved and the financial industry has reached a new equilibrium,
subsidiaries should theoretically no longer be necessary. If this state of
affairs does come to pass, the system of financial laws and regulations
may again come to hamper the proper development of Japan's capital
markets, necessitating a new round of reforms.
Given the above, it seems that the Financial System Reform Act
can only be the first step on the road to a universal banking sys-
tem? 9 If so, the current round of legal reforms is merely a begin-
ning, a slow, tortuous detour planned by the MOF to ensure that
everyone arrives safely one way or another. Reports of the demise of
the convoy system, therefore, seem quite premature.35
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349. See, eg., Bankers' Embrace, supra note 289, at 90 ("The finance ministry has said that
it is not yet ready for German-style universal banking in Japan, but this is what it may have to
settle for.").
350. E.g., The Convoy Scatters, A SURVEY OF WORLD BANKING (Supp.), in ECONOMIST,
May 2, 1992, at 44, 47 (predicting the break-up of the "convoy system" due to the current
financial crisis and ongoing financial reform).
